Rentier state: differenze tra le versioni

Versione delle 09:50, 23 dic 2009

Versione delle 09:59, 23 dic 2009

Riga 11:

# and, perhaps most importantly, that the state’s government is the principal recipient of the external rent.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.87-88</ref> ------------------------------------>

L'emergere dei nuovi stati [[Petrolio|petroliferi]] e la loro crescente importanza nel commercio mondiale negli [[Anni 1970|anni '70]] portò un rinnovato interesse nel pensiero sulle economie di rendita nelle sopramenzionate discipline delle [[scienze politiche]] e delle [[relazioni internazionali]].<!---------------------------------------------------------------<ref name="Beblawi">ibid</ref> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->Tra gli esempi di ''rentier state'', rientrano i paesi produttori di petrolio presenti sia nella regione del [[Medio Oriente]], tra cui [[Arabia Saudita]], [[Emirati Arabi Uniti]], [[Iraq]], [[Iran]], [[Kuwait]] e [[Qatar]], sia il [[Venezuela]] in [[America latina]] e la [[Libia]] nel [[Nordafrica]], i quali sono tutti membri dell'[[OPEC]].<!---------------------------------------------------<ref name="Beblawi">ibid</ref> <ref>Anderson, L., 1987, The State in the Middle East North Africa, ''Comparative Politics'', Volume 20, Issue 1, Pages 1-18</ref> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->La teoria del ''rentier state'' è stata una delle molte avanzate per spiegare la predominanza di regimi autoritaristi nel Medio Oriente e l'apparente mancanzainsuccesso didella successodemocrazia nella regione.<!-----------------------------della [[Democracy in the Middle East|democrazia nella regione]].<ref>Smith, B., 2004, Oil Wealth & Regime Survival in the Developing World: 1960-1999, ''American Journal of Political Science'', Volume 48, Issue 2, Pages 232-246 </ref> While-------------->Mentre manymolti statesstati [[exportEsportazione (commercio)|esportano]] resourcesle orrisorse licenseo theirrilasciano developmentconcessioni byper foreignil partiesloro sfruttamente a soggetti stranieri, i ''rentier statesstate'' aresono characterizedcaratterizzati bydall'assenza therelativa relativedi absenceentrate ofgenerate [[revenue]]dall'imposizione fromfiscale domestic [[taxation]]interna, <!--------------------------------------------as their naturally occurring wealth precludes the need to extract income from their [[citizenshipCittadinanza (diritto)|citizenrycittadinanza]]. According toSecondo Douglas Yates (cited [http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_227.html here]), theil economiccomportamento behavioreconomico ofdi aun ''rentier state''

<blockquote>embodies a break in the work-reward causation ... [r]ewards of income and wealth for the rentier do not come as the result of work but rather are the result of chance or situation.</blockquote>

Hazem Beblawi has argued that this could create a “rentier mentality,”<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.88</ref> while [[Political science|political scientist]] [[Fareed Zakaria]] has posited that such states fail to develop politically because, in the absence of taxes, citizens have less incentive to place pressure on the government to become responsive to their needs. Instead, the government essentially 'bribes' the citizenry with extensive [[social welfare]] programs, becoming an '''allocation''' or '''distributive state'''. The budget, in effect, is little more than an expenditure programme.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.90</ref> Moreover, because control of the rent-producing resources is concentrated in the hands of the authorities, it may be used to alternately coerce or coopt their populace, while the distinction between public service and private interest becomes increasingly blurred.<ref name="Beblawi">ibid, p.91</ref> There is, in the words of [[Noah Feldman]] in his book ''After Jihad'',