Ethical intuitionism: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 13:25, 1 January 2006

Revision as of 01:55, 2 January 2006

Line 9:

Sometimes the term "ethical intuitionism" is associated with a pluralistic, deontological position in [[normative ethics]], a position defended by [[W.D. Ross]].

== The Notionnotion of Intuitionintuition ==

== The Notion of Intuition ==

Some intuitionists characterize "intuitions" as a species of beliefs, beliefs which are ''[[self-evidence|self-evident]]'' in the sense that they are justified simply by virtue of one's understanding of the proposition believed.

Others characterize "intuitions" as a distinct kind of mental state, in which something ''seems'' to one to be the case (whether one believes it or not) as a result of intellectual reflection. All ethical intuitionists agree in characterizing intuitions as cognitive mental states that do not depend on observation or inference.

== History ==

Line 29 ⟶ 27:

Some recent work suggests the view may be enjoying a resurgence of interest in academic philosophy.

== Further Readingreading ==

Following are some important works by ethical intuitionists.

* [[G.E. Moore]], ''Principia Ethica'' (Cambridge University Press, 1903).

* [[W.D. Ross]], ''The Right and the Good'' (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930).

* Michael Huemer, ''Ethical Intuitionism'' (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

[[W.D. Ross]], ''The Right and the Good'' (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930).

Michael Huemer, ''Ethical Intuitionism'' (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

== External Links ==

== External Linkslinks ==

[http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/book2.htm ''Ethical Intuitionism''], a contemporary defense of the theory.

* [http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/ethicsbook2.htm Papers''Ethical defending intuitionismIntuitionism''], a contemporary defense of the theory.

* [http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/ethics.htm Papers defending intuitionism].