Rationalism: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 21:37, 1 March 2006

Revision as of 08:53, 2 March 2006

Line 7:

The distinction between rationalists and empiricists was drawn at a later period, and would not have been recognised by the philosophers involved. Also, the distinction wasn't as clear-cut as is sometimes suggested; for example, the three main rationalists were all committed to the importance of empirical science, and in many respects the empiricists were closer to Descartes in their methods and metaphysical theories than were Spinoza and Leibniz. Thus, although it can be useful when organising courses or writing books, the distinction is less useful philosophically.

Rationalists typically argued that, starting with intuitively-understood basic principles, like the axioms of [[geometry]], one could [[deductive reasoning|deductively]] derive the rest of knowledge. The philosophers who held this view most clearly were [[Baruch Spinoza]] and [[Gottfried Leibniz]], whose attempts to grapple with the epistemological and metaphysical problems raised by Descartes led to a development of the fundamental approach of rationalism. Both Spinoza and Leibniz thought that, ''in principle'', all knowledge – including scientific knowledge – could be gained through the use of reason alone, though they both accepted that ''in practice'' this wasn't possible for human beings except in specific areas such as mathmaths.

Descartes, on the other hand, was closer to [[Plato]], thinking that only knowledge of eternal truths – including the truths of mathematics, and the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the sciences – could be attained by reason alone; other knowledge required experience of the world, aided by the scientific method. It would perhaps be most accurate to say that he was a rationalist with regard to metaphysics, but somewhat akin to the empiricists with regard to the physical sciences.