Two-part tariff: Difference between revisions

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If the firm is perfectly competitive, it would charge price Pc and supply Qc to our consumer, making no [[economic profit#Economic definitions of profit|economic profit]] but producing an [[allocative efficiency|allocatively efficient]] output. If the firm is a ''non-price discriminating'' monopolist, it would charge price Pm per unit and supply Qm, maximizing profit but producing below the allocatively efficient level of output Qc. This situation yields economic profit for the firm equal to the green area B, consumer surplus equal to the light blue area A, and a [[deadweight loss]] equal to the purple area C.
 
If the firm is a ''price discriminating'' monopolist, then it has the capacity to extract more resources from the consumer. It charges a lump sum fee, as well as a per unit cost. In order to sell the maximum number of units, the firm must charge the perfectly competitive price per unit, Pc, because this is the only price at which Qc units can be sold (note this is also the marginal cost per unit). To make up for the lower cost per unit, the firm then imposes a fee upon our consumer equal to her consumer surplus, ABC. <-- I don't understand why this works.
 
The lump-sum fee enables the firm to capture all the consumer surplus and deadweight loss areas, resulting in higher profit than a non-price discriminating monopolist could manage. The result is a firm which is in a sense allocatively efficient (price per unit is equal to marginal cost, but total price is not) - one of the redeeming qualities of price discrimination. If there are multiple consumers with homogeneous demand, then profit will equal n times the area ABC, where n is the number of consumers.