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This is a link to a SAGE notebook. SAGE is an important open-source computer-algebra system. A notebook has to be run in your browser to use it -- when you just open it, without starting it, you see the source-code which may appear to be similar to TeX. To start the notebook just click "Evaluate". [BE] <small><span class="autosigned">— Preceding [[Wikipedia:Signatures|unsigned]] comment added by [[User:BeEs1|BeEs1]] ([[User talk:BeEs1|talk]] • [[Special:Contributions/BeEs1|contribs]]) 11:08, 1 December 2011 (UTC)</span></small><!-- Template:Unsigned --> <!--Autosigned by SineBot-->
== Quantum Computing Attack Citations ==
In reference to quantum computing attacks the article reads "Elliptic curve cryptography is vulnerable to a modified Shor's algorithm for solving the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves" with two citations (<ref>{{cite journal |title=Using the Quantum Computer to Break Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems |first=Jodie |last=Eicher |first2=Yaw |last2=Opoku |date=July 29, 1997 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |title=Shor's Discrete Logarithm Quantum Algorithm for Elliptic Curves |first=John |last=Proos |first2=Christof |last2=Zalka |year=2003 |journal=Quantum Information and Computing |volume=3 |issue=4 |pages=317–344 |doi= |arxiv=quant-ph/0301141 |bibcode=2003quant.ph..1141P }}</ref>). Looking through both of these citations, they both work over fields of prime order, with the latter paper explicitly stating that they did not consider fields of prime power order. If ECC over fields of prime power order is truly vulnerable to QC attacks, I think there should be a citation that references this. [[User:GromXXVII|GromXXVII]] ([[User talk:GromXXVII|talk]]) 22:20, 25 June 2012 (UTC)
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