Command and control regulation: Difference between revisions

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It is far from a problem free form of regulation, the 1980s in particular saw CAC subject to widespread criticism. A good number of the critics tend to favour market-based strategies and are often dubious of the merits of governmental regulatory approaches <ref name="Baldwin"/>
 
Some issues highlighted include:<ref name="Baldwin"/>:
 
*[[Capture (politics)|Capture]]: The concern here is that the relationship between regulators and the regulated may lead to the interests of the public being neglected. In this situation it is possible for the relationship to become too close, leading to capture. This may result in the regulator protecting the interests of the regulated.
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==Efficiency==
 
Much of the literature on regulatory instruments considers efficiency in terms of monetary costs. CAC has been labelled by many critics as ‘inefficient’ as a system that spends resources but generates little revenue.<ref name=sinclair>Gunningham, N., Sinclair, D. (2002) Leaders and Laggards: Next Generation Environmental Regulation. UK: Greenleaf Publishing Ltd.</ref> The cost of compliance is perceived to be high, which can result in costs that are higher than the sanctions for non-compliance. A summary of 10 studies demonstrated significant differences in cost between CAC and least cost alternatives.<ref name="tieten">Tietenberg,T. (1991) Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation. "In: Helm, D., Pearce, D. (ed.) Economic Policy towards the Environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press."</ref>
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The use of Command and Control in regulation involves the government or similar body to “command” the reduction of pollution (e.g. setting emissions levels) levels and to “control” the manner in which it is achieved (e.g. by installing pollution-control technologies). It has been argued that CAC has the potential to be effective under certain conditions. Often its effectiveness can be determined by whether the problem has a diffuse or a point source. A CAC approach is relatively compatible with [[point source]] and regulation of these can often achieve success. On the other hand, CAC struggles to appropriately tackle issues that have a [[Diffusion|diffuse]], non-point source.<ref name="landr">Landy, M. Rubin, C. (2001) Civic Environmentalism: A new approach to Policyl. Washington DC: George Marshall Institute</ref> Evans<ref name="james"/> draws on the following example: “it is relatively easy to regulate the emissions from 10 large coal burning power stations in a single country, but far less easy to monitor the emissions caused by millions of motorists or the effluent discharges from tens of thousands of farms across the world.”
 
In [[Environmental Policy]], CAC is characterised by 3 different types of standards, the use of the standards is determined by various factors, including the nature of the environmental problem and the administrative capacities of the governing body:<ref name="ogus">Ogus, A. (2004) Comparing Regulatory Systems: Institutions, processes and legal forms in industrialised countries. ''In: Cook, P., Kirkpatrick, C. Minogue, M., Parker, D. (Eds.)'' UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.</ref>:
 
*Environmental Standards. These are centrally driven standards. A legally enforceable numerical limit is often used to determine the 'standard', but the term can be used more broadly, describing more general rules about acceptability.
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The 1987 Montreal Protocol is commonly cited as a CAC success story at international level. The aim of the agreement was to limit the release of [[Chlorofluorocarbons]] into the atmosphere and subsequently halt the depletion of Ozone (O3) in the stratosphere.
 
There were a number of factors that contributed to Montreal’s success, these included :<ref name="speth">Speth, J., Haas, P. (2006) Global Environmental Governance. USA: Island Press.</ref><ref name="falkner">Falkner, R (2005) The Business of Ozone Layer Protection: Corporate Power in Regime Evolution. ''In: Levy, D., Newell, P. (2005) The Business of Global Environmental Governance. pp. 169-196.'' Cambridge Mass & London: MIT Press.</ref>:
 
*The problem and solution were both clearly defined and supported by industry (albeit not initially)