Causal theory of reference: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 23:31, 20 September 2015

Revision as of 10:49, 10 March 2016

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== Motivation ==

Causal theories of reference were born partially in response to the widespread acceptance of Russellian descriptive theories. Russell found that certain [[logic]]al [[contradiction]]s could be avoided if names were considered disguised [[definite description]]s (a similar view is often attributed to [[Gottlob Frege|Frege]], mostly on the strength of a footnoted comment in ''[[On Sense and Reference]]'', although many Frege scholars consider this attribution misguided{{cncitation needed|date=January 2012}}). On such an account, the name 'Aristotle' might be seen as meaning 'the student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great'. Later description theorists expanded upon this by suggesting that a name expressed not one particular description, but many (perhaps constituting all of one's essential knowledge of the individual named), or a weighted average of these descriptions.

Kripke found this account to be deeply flawed, for a number of reasons. Notably:

* We can successfully refer to individuals for whom we have ''no'' uniquely identifying description. (For example, a speaker can talk about Phillie Sophik even if one only knows him as 'some poet'.)

* We can successfully refer to individuals for whom the only identifying descriptions we have fail to refer as we believe them to. (Many speakers have no identifying beliefs about [[Christopher Columbus]] other than 'the first European in North America' or 'the first person to believe that the earth was round'. Both of these beliefs are incorrect. Nevertheless, when such a person says 'Christopher Columbus', we acknowledge that they are referring to Christopher Columbus, not to whatever individual satisfies one of those descriptions.)

* We use names to speak hypothetically about what ''could'' have happened to a person. A name functions as a [[rigid designator]], while a definite description does not. (One could say 'If Aristotle had died young, he would never have taught Alexander the Great.' But if 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' were a component of the ''meaning'' of 'Aristotle' then this would be nonsense.)

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== Criticisms of the theory ==

* [[Gareth Evans (philosopher)|Gareth Evans]] argued that the causal theory, or at least certain common and over-simple variants of it, have the consequence that, however remote or obscure the causal connection between someone's use of a proper name and the object it originally referred to, they still refer to that object when they use the name. (Imagine a name briefly overheard in a train or café.) The theory effectively ignores context and makes reference into a magic trick. Evans describes it as a "[[photograph]]" theory of reference.

* The links between different users of the name are particularly obscure. Each user must somehow pass the name on to the next, and must somehow "mean" the right individual as they do so (suppose "Socrates" is the name of a pet [[aardvark]]). Kripke himself notes the difficulty, [[John Searle]] makes much of it.{{Citation needed|reason=Reliable source needed for the whole sentence|date=September 2015}}

* [[Mark Sainsbury (philosopher)|Mark Sainsbury]] argued<ref>[http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23599/?id=1343 ''Departing from Frege''] Essay XII</ref> for a causal theory similar to Kripke's, except that the baptised object is eliminated. A "baptism" may be a baptism of nothing, he argues: a name can be intelligibly introduced even if it names nothing.<ref>{{

harvnb|Sainsbury|2001|p=212}}</ref> The causal chain we associate with the use of proper names may begin merely with a "journalistic" source.<ref>{{

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* The causal theory has a difficult time explaining the phenomenon of reference change. [[Gareth Evans (philosopher)|Gareth Evans]] cites the example of when [[Marco Polo]] unknowingly referred to the African Island as "Madagascar" when the natives actually used the term to refer to a part of the mainland. Evans claims that Polo clearly intended to use the term as the natives do, but somehow changed the meaning of the term "Madagascar" to refer to the island as it is known today. [[Michael Devitt]] claims that repeated groundings in an object can account for reference change. However, such a response leaves open the problem of cognitive significance that originally intrigued Russell and Frege.

* East-Asians are more likely than Americans to have intuitions about reference in line with descriptivist theories.<ref>{{

harvnb|Machery|Mallon|Nichols|Stich|2004}}</ref>