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{{wikinews|High definition anti-piracy DRM possibly hacked}}
The AACS proposal was voted one of the technologies most likely to fail by ''[[IEEE Spectrum]]'' magazine's readers in the January 2005 issue.<ref>{{cite web
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|date = January 2007
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|deadurl = yes
|archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20070608074811/http://spectrum.ieee.org/jan05/2703
|archivedate = 2007-06-08
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Concerns about the approach included its similarity to past systems that failed, such as CSS, and the inability to preserve security against attacks that compromise large numbers of players. [[Jon Lech Johansen]], who was part of the team that circumvented CSS, said he expected AACS to be cracked by the end of 2006 or the beginning of 2007.<ref>{{cite web
| url = http://nanocrew.net/2006/01/08/deaacscom/
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Microsoft later claimed that the paper contained various factual errors.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://windowsvistablog.com/blogs/windowsvista/archive/2007/01/20/windows-vista-content-protection-twenty-questions-and-answers.aspx|title=Windows Vista Content Protection - Twenty Questions (and Answers)|deadurl=yes|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20130121121652/http://blogs.windows.com/windows/archive/b/windowsvista/archive/2007/01/20/windows-vista-content-protection-twenty-questions-and-answers.aspx|archivedate=2013-01-21|df=}}</ref><ref>[[Peter Gutmann (computer scientist)#Criticism of Peter Gutmann.27s analysis of Vista DRM]]</ref>
While great care had been taken with AACS to ensure that content was encrypted along the entire path from the disc to the display device, it was discovered in July 2006 that a perfect copy of any still frame from a film could be captured from certain [[Blu-ray]] and [[HD DVD]] software players by using the [[Print Screen]] function of the Windows operating system.<ref>{{cite web
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{{Details|AACS encryption key controversy}}
[[Cyberlink]], the company which sells the [[PowerDVD]] player, stated that their software could not have been used as part of these exploits.<ref>{{cite web
|date = 2007-01-02
|first =
|last =
|url = http://msmvps.com/blogs/chrisl/archive/2007/01/02/463980.aspx
|title = Cyberlink Responds to Alleged AACS Crack
|accessdate = 2007-05-02
|deadurl = yes
|archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20070616212554/http://msmvps.com/blogs/chrisl/archive/2007/01/02/463980.aspx
|archivedate = 2007-06-16
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On April 16, 2007, the AACS consortium announced that it had revoked the Device Keys used by both Cyberlink PowerDVD and InterVideo WinDVD, and patches were made available for users which provided uncompromised encryption keys and better security for the keys.<ref>{{cite web
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To continue having the ability to view new content users were forced to apply the patches, which also hardened the security of player applications.
On 23 May 2007 the Processing Key for the next version of the Media Key Block was posted to the comments page of a Freedom to Tinker blog post.<ref>{{cite web
|url = http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1155
|title = You Can Own an Integer Too
|accessdate = 2007-06-09
|accessdate=2007-06-09}} [https://web.archive.org/web/20070824092116/http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1155#comment-367359 Archived copy of page] (original link dead)</ref>▼
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|archivedate = 2007-08-24
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The use of encryption does not offer any true protection against memory snooping, since the software player must have the encryption key available somewhere in memory and there is no way to protect against a determined PC owner extracting the encryption key (if everything else fails the user could run the program in a [[virtual machine]] making it possible to freeze the program and inspect all memory addresses without the program knowing).
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[[SlySoft]] has released [[AnyDVD]] HD which allows users to watch HD DVD and Blu-ray movies on non-[[HDCP]]-compliant PC hardware. The movies can be decrypted on the fly directly from the disc, or can be copied to another medium. AnyDVD HD is also capable of automatically removing any unwanted logos and trailers. Slysoft has stated that AnyDVD HD uses several different mechanisms to disable the encryption, and is not dependent on the use of compromised encryption keys. They have also stated that AACS has even more flaws in its implementation than CSS; this renders it highly vulnerable,<ref>{{cite web
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|work = Slysoft forums
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|archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20070927092642/http://forum.slysoft.com/showpost.php?s=dd10095bbb7307dcbb16168166d2087e&p=9286&postcount=2
|archivedate = 2007-09-27
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but they will release no details on their implementation. Users at Doom9 claim that the program makes use of the host certificate of [[PowerDVD]] version 6.5,<ref> {{cite web
| url = http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?t=122272
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| work = Doom9.net Forums }} </ref>
but SlySoft has claimed that the program would be unaffected by the AACS revocation system.<ref>{{cite web
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|work = Slysoft forums
|deadurl = yes
|archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20070927092544/http://forum.slysoft.com/showpost.php?p=15263&postcount=10
|archivedate = 2007-09-27
|df =
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=== Media key block renewals ===
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