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The theory leads to the ''long cycle theory'' of war and seeks to explain trends between warring states in the past 500 years. The general trend is that a nation achieves [[hegemony|hegemonic power]] and then is challenged by a [[great power]]. This leads to a war which, in the past, has created a transition between the two powers. Eugene R. Wittkopf explores past wars and their relation to Power Transition theory in his book ''World Politics: Trend and Transformation''. He explains this using [[George Modelski]]'s Seapower Concentration Index.<ref name="Wittkopf"/>
At 1518, [[Portugal]] assumed a hegemonic position in world politics. However, as the [[Netherlands]] (which was experiencing the [[Dutch Golden Age]]) rose in power, a series of struggles led to the destruction of Spain's power and a transition to Dutch hegemony. Dutch hegemony was brought into question again in 1688 with the Wars of Louis XIV, which resulted in what is referred to as the "Britain I Cycle", the [[Napoleonic Wars]] interrupted this cycle and questioned the hegemony Britain possessed. However, Britain's victory resulted in maintenance of power and the "Britain II Cycle".<ref name="Wittkopf"/> This cycle ended with the World Wars and Wittkopf shows the period of 1914-1945 as one of particular turbulence in which no power maintained hegemony, even after the [[Treaty of Versailles]].<ref name="Wittkopf"/> After the second World War, a drastic increase in seapower concentration by the [[United States]] was experienced and it –
In general, hegemonic periods last approximately 60 to 90 years and conflicts which result in a period stabilization of power distribution last approximately 20 years.<ref name="Wittkopf"/> This can be explained through [[war-weariness]] and the tendency (although this was broken in the first half of the 20th century) for nations not to engage themselves in another conflict after being involved in a power transition.<ref name="Wittkopf"/>
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