Causal theory of reference: Difference between revisions

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== Variations<!--'Causal-historical theory of reference', 'Causal-descriptive theory of reference', and 'Descriptive-causal theory of reference' redirect here--> ==

Variations of the causal theory include:

* The '''causal-historical theory of reference'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> is the original version of the causal theory. It was put forward by [[Keith Donnellan]] in 1972<ref>Donnellan, Keith. (1972). "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions."</ref> and [[Saul Kripke]] in 1980.<ref>Kripke, S. "A Puzzle about Belief", 1979, in Martinich (ed) 1996, pp 382–409.</ref><ref name=SEP>[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/names/ Names (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)]</ref> This view introduces the idea of reference-passing links in a causal-historical chain.<ref name=SEP/>

* The '''descriptive-causal theory of reference'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> (also '''causal-descriptive theory of reference''')<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--><ref name=Psillos279>[[Stathis Psillos]], ''Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth'', Routledge, 1999, p. 279.</ref> a view put forward by [[David Lewis (philosopher)|David Lewis]].<ref name=Psillos279/><ref name=Gattei>Stefano Gattei, ''Thomas Kuhn's 'Linguistic Turn' and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism: Incommensurability, Rationality and the Search for Truth'', Ashgate Publishing, 2012, p. 122.</ref> nin 1984,<ref>D. 232K. Lewis (1984), "Putnam's Paradox." ''Australasian Journal of Philosophy'', '''62'''(3), 221–36; reprinted in D. Lewis (1999), ''Papers on metaphysics and epistemology'', Cambridge University Press, pp. 56–77.</ref> introduces the idea that a minimal descriptive apparatus needs to e added to the causal relations between speaker and object.<ref name=Gattei/>

== Criticisms of the theory ==