Causal theory of reference: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 23:41, 21 November 2017

Revision as of 23:42, 21 November 2017

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== Motivation ==

Causal theories of reference were born partially in response to the widespread acceptance of Russellian descriptive theories. Russell found that certain [[logic]]al [[contradiction]]s could be avoided if names were considered disguised [[definite description]]s (a similar view is often attributed to [[Gottlob Frege|Frege]], mostly on the strength of a footnoted comment in ''"[[On Sense and Reference]]''", although many Frege scholars consider this attribution misguided).{{citation needed|date=January 2012}}). On such an account, the name 'Aristotle' might be seen as meaning 'the student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great'. Later description theorists expanded upon this by suggesting that a name expressed not one particular description, but many (perhaps constituting all of one's essential knowledge of the individual named), or a weighted average of these descriptions.

Kripke found this account to be deeply flawed, for a number of reasons. Notably: