Transient-key cryptography: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 23:54, 6 September 2018

Revision as of 16:10, 27 October 2018

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==Public-key vs. transient-key cryptography==

Both [[Public key|public-key]] and transient-key systems can be used to generate [[digital signature]]s that assert that a given piece of data has not changed since it was signed. But the similarities end there.

In a traditional public key system, the public/private keypair is typically assigned to an individual, server, or organization. Data signed by a private key asserts that the signature came from the indicated source. Keypairs persist for years at a time, so the private component must be carefully guarded against disclosure; in a public-key system, anyone with access to a private key can counterfeit that person’sperson's digital signature.

In transient-key systems, however, the keypair is assigned to a brief interval of time, not to a particular person or entity. Data signed by a specific private key becomes associated with a specific time and date. A keypair is active only for a few minutes, after which the private key is permanently destroyed. Therefore, unlike public-key systems, transient-key systems do not depend upon the long-term security of the private keys.

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==Verification==

During an interval, the transient private key is used to sign data concatenated with trusted timestamps and authenticity certificates. To [[File verification|verify]] the data at a later time, a receiver accesses the [[Persistence (computer science)|persistent]] public key for the appropriate time interval. The public key applied to the digital signature can be passed through published cryptographic routines to unpack the [[Cryptographic hash function|hash]] of the original data, which is then compared against a fresh hash of the stored data to verify data integrity. If the signature successfully decrypts using a particular interval’sinterval's published public key, the receiver can be assured that the signature originated during that time period. If the decrypted and fresh hashes match, the receiver can be assured that the data has not been tampered with since the transient private key created the timestamp and signed the data.

Transient-key cryptography was invented in 1997 by Dr. Michael D. Doyle of [http://www.eolas.com Eolas Technologies Inc.] and later acquired by and productized by [http://www.proofspace.com ProofSpace, Inc]. It is protected under [https://patents.google.com/patent/US6381696B1/en US Patents #6,381,696], [https://patents.google.com/patent/US7017046/en 7,017,046], [https://patents.google.com/patent/US7047415/en 7,047,415], & [https://patents.google.com/patent/US7210035/en 7,210,035], and has been included in the [[ANSI ASC X9.95 Standard|ANSI ASC X9.95 standard for Trusted Timestamping]]. Transient-key cryptography is the predecessor to [[Forward secrecy]]. Despite the appearance that the [[Bitcoin]] [[blockchain (database)|blockchain]] technology was derived from Transient-key cryptography, Dr. Doyle has publicly denied he is [[Satoshi Nakamoto]].

* [http://www.proofspace.com ProofSpace, Inc] has published a more detailed [http://fios.com/proofmarksystemtech.pdf technical overview document] of transient key cryptography.