Causal theory of reference: Difference between revisions

Content deleted Content added
Spinningspark (talk | contribs)
m Reverted edits by 49.180.134.121 (talk) to last version by 79.107.104.246
Line 45:
 
The causal theory has a difficult time explaining the phenomenon of reference change. [[Gareth Evans (philosopher)|Gareth Evans]] cites the example of when [[Marco Polo]] unknowingly referred to the African Island as "Madagascar" when the natives actually used the term to refer to a part of the mainland. Evans claims that Polo clearly intended to use the term as the natives do, but somehow changed the meaning of the term "Madagascar" to refer to the island as it is known today. [[Michael Devitt]] claims that repeated groundings in an object can account for reference change. However, such a response leaves open the problem of cognitive significance that originally intrigued Russell and Frege.
 
East Asians are more likely than Americans to have intuitions about reference in line with descriptivist theories.<ref>{{
harvnb|Machery|Mallon|Nichols|Stich|2004}}</ref>
 
==See also==