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'''Algorithmic mechanism design''' ('''AMD
[[Noam Nisan]] and Amir Ronen, from the [[Hebrew University of Jerusalem]], first coined "Algorithmic mechanism design" in a research paper published in 1999.<ref name="nisan">{{citation
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Algorithmic mechanism design differs from classical economic mechanism design in several respects. It typically employs the analytic tools of [[theoretical computer science]], such as [[worst case analysis]] and [[approximation ratio]]s, in contrast to classical mechanism design in economics which often makes distributional assumptions about the agents. It also considers computational constraints to be of central importance: mechanisms that cannot be efficiently implemented in polynomial time are not considered to be viable solutions to a mechanism design problem. This often, for example, rules out the classic economic mechanism, the [[Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction]].
==See also==▼
*[[Algorithmic game theory]]▼
*[[Computational social choice]]▼
*[[Metagame]]▼
*[[Incentive compatible]]▼
*[[Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism]]▼
==References and notes==
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| title = Algorithmic Mechanism Design
| url = http://www.cs.uu.nl/docs/vakken/msagi/mech_design.pdf}}.
▲==See also==
▲*[[Algorithmic game theory]]
▲*[[Computational social choice]]
▲*[[Metagame]]
▲*[[Incentive compatible]]
▲*[[Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism]]
[[Category:Game theory]]
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