Two-part tariff: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 01:25, 26 November 2019

Revision as of 07:04, 3 December 2019

Line 1:

{{More footnotes|date=February 2010}}

[[A]]<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Iverson|first=Cheryl|date=2009-04-01|title=Software Manual or Guide|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jama/9780195176339.022.97|journal=AMA Manual of Style|doi=10.1093/jama/9780195176339.022.97}}</ref> '''two-part tariff''' (TPT) is a form of [[price discrimination]] wherein the price of a [[product (business)|product]] or [[Service (economics)|service]] is composed of two parts - a lump-sum fee as well as a per-unit charge.<ref>Palgrave Dictionary of Economics: http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2011_T000188</ref>{{Dead link|date=November 2019}}<ref>Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld: ''Microeconomics'', 8th edition, Pearson, 2013, p. 414.</ref> In general, such a pricing technique only occurs in partially or fully [[monopoly|monopolistic]] [[market (economics)|market]]s. It is designed to enable the firm to capture more [[consumer surplus]] than it otherwise would in a non-discriminating pricing environment. Two-part tariffs may also exist in [[Competition (economics)|competitive markets]] when consumers are uncertain about their ultimate demand. Health club consumers, for example, may be uncertain about their level of future commitment to an exercise regimen.

Depending on the homogeneity of demand, the lump-sum fee charged varies, but the rational firm will set the per unit charge '''above or equal to''' the [[marginal cost]] of production, and '''below or equal to''' the price the firm would charge in a [[Monopoly#Monopolistic pricing|perfect monopoly]]. Under [[Competition (economics)|competition]] the per-unit price is set below marginal cost.<ref>Hayes, B. (1987), p. 42.</ref>

Line 53:

==References==

*{{Cite journal |last=Hayes |first=Beth |author-link= |year=1987 |title=Competition and Two-Part Tariffs |periodical=Journal of Business |volume=60 |issue=1 |pages=41–54 |jstor=2352946 |issn= |doi=10.1086/296384 |publisher=University of Chicago Press }}

*{{cite book

| first = Don E.

Line 63:

| publisher = Pearson Addison Wesley

| isbn = 0-201-65877-1

| chapter-url-access = registration

| chapter-url = https://archive.org/details/microeconomics0000wald

}}

* Schlereth, C., Stepanchuk, T., Skiera, B. (2010): “Optimization and Analysis of Profitability of Tariff Structures with Different Number of Two-Part Tariffs,” European Journal of Operational Research (EJOR), 206(3), 691-701.