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== Insertion and evasion ==
Attackers can evade IDS by crafting packets in such a way that the end host interprets the attack payload correctly while the IDS either interprets the attack incorrectly or determines that the traffic is benign too quickly.<ref name=":
=== Fragmentation and small packets ===
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=== Overlapping fragments and TCP segments ===
Another evasion technique is to craft a series of packets with [[Transmission Control Protocol|TCP sequence numbers]] configured to overlap. For example, the first packet will include 80 bytes of payload but the second packet's sequence number will be 76 bytes after the start of the first packet. When the target computer reassembles the TCP stream, they must decide how to handle the four overlapping bytes. Some operating systems will take the older data, and some will take the newer data.<ref name=":
=== Protocol ambiguities ===
Some IDS evasion techniques involve deliberately manipulating [[Transmission Control Protocol|TCP]] or [[Internet Protocol|IP]] protocols in a way the target computer will handle differently from the IDS. For example, the TCP urgent pointer is handled differently on different operating systems. If the IDS doesn't handle these protocol violations in a manner consistent with its end hosts, it is vulnerable to insertion and evasion techniques similar to those mentioned earlier.<ref name=":
=== Low-bandwidth attacks ===
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== Denial of service ==
Due to the fact that passive IDS are inherently [[fail-open]] (as opposed to [[fail-closed]]), launching a [[denial-of-service attack]] against the IDS on a network is a feasible method of circumventing its protection.<ref name=":
=== CPU exhaustion ===
Packets captured by an IDS are stored in a kernel buffer until the CPU is ready to process them. If the CPU is under high load, it can't process the packets quickly enough and this buffer fills up. New (and possibly malicious) packets are then dropped because the buffer is full.<ref name=":
An attacker can exhaust the IDS's CPU resources in a number of ways. For example, signature-based intrusion detection systems use pattern matching algorithms to match incoming packets against signatures of known attacks. Naturally, some signatures are more computational expensive to match against than others. Exploiting this fact, an attacker can send specially-crafted network traffic to force the IDS to use the maximum amount of CPU time as possible to run its pattern matching algorithm on the traffic.<ref name=":12" /><ref name=":22" /> This [[algorithmic complexity attack]] can overwhelm the IDS with a relatively small amount of bandwidth.<ref name=":12" />
An IDS that also monitors encrypted traffic can spend a large portion of its CPU resources on decrypting incoming data.<ref name=":
=== Memory exhaustion ===
In order to match certain signatures, an IDS is required to keep [[State (computer science)|state]] related to the connections it is monitoring. For example, an IDS must maintain "TCP control blocks" (TCBs), chunks of memory which track information such as sequence numbers, window sizes, and connection states (ESTABLISHED, RELATED, CLOSED, etc.), for each TCP connection monitored by the IDS.<ref name=":
If the IDS doesn't [[Garbage collection (computer science)|garbage collect]] TCBs correctly and efficiently, an attacker can exhaust the IDS's memory by starting a large number of TCP connections very quickly.<ref name=":
===Operator fatigue===
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