Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources: Difference between revisions
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While crop and livestock cultivation are more susceptible to drought or irrigation failures, wildlife serves as a more dependable source of income due to their comparative advantage in the environment.<ref name=":6" /> The scale of benefits varies greatly across districts, wards and households. Rural district councils typically allocate 40-60% of revenue to wards, either through direct benefits or through funding projects.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=Child|first=Brian|date=1993|title=Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE programme: using the high value of wildlife recreation to revolutionize natural resource management in communal areas|journal=The Commonwealth Forestry Review|volume=72|issue=4|pages=284–296|jstor=42606968}}</ref> It has been estimated by the World Wildlife Fund that households participating in CAMPFIRE increased their incomes by 15-25%.<ref>{{Cite web | url=http://www1.american.edu/ted/campfire.htm | title=American University, Washington, D.C | access-date=2014-09-29 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150612030244/http://www1.american.edu/ted/campfire.htm | archive-date=2015-06-12 | url-status=dead }}</ref>
Communities also receive indirect benefits through community projects, such as the construction of schools, clinics, grinding mills, or prospects for additional income through employment as a game monitor or a related job.<ref name=":4" /> Depending on wildlife population density, some wards have diversified their revenue streams. For instance, the Mahenye ward had no elephants or large wildlife immediately around its district and opened game-viewing lodges to generate revenue in place of hunting contracts.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last=Balint|first=Peter|date=2009|title=CAMPFIRE During Zimbabwe's National Crisis: Local Impacts and Broader Implications for Community-Based Wildlife Management|journal=Society and Natural Resources|volume=21|issue=9|pages=783–796|doi=10.1080/08941920701681961}}</ref> Wards with higher per household revenue have encouraged immigration in order to increase population density in a way that would warrant the development of roads, schools, and other infrastructure suited for high population densities.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Murombedzi|first=James C.|date=1999|title=Devolution and Stewardship in Zimbabwe's Campfire Programme
=== Wildlife and Land Management ===
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Following Zimbabwe's economic downturn in the 2000s, CAMPFIRE experienced a greater degree of elite capture, with villagers reporting that council positions and CAMPFIRE-related employment opportunities being held by friends and family members of sitting councillors.<ref name=":5" /> RDCs have retained an increasing percentage of CAMPFIRE revenues and are criticized for being unresponsive to local concerns.<ref name=":3" /> In some areas, the communal projects are initiated but are not sustained, while the income from CAMPFIRE revenues is insufficient to substitute agricultural income.<ref name=":2" />
Villagers express concern that wildlife protection supersedes their own safety and livelihood strategies. Some wards have restricted immigration, settlement expansion, and the use of natural resources.<ref name=":0" /> Physical restrictions on land expansion bar villagers from accessing more fertile land.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Alexander|first=Jocelyn|date=2002|title=Wildlife and politics: CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe|url=|journal=Development and Change|volume=31|issue=3|pages=605–627
==See also==
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| journal = [[Erdkunde]]
| date = 2002-04-01
| doi = 10.3112/erdkunde.2002.02.06
| jstor = 25647452
}}
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