Modular programming: Difference between revisions

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'''Modularity''' is a concept that has applications in the contexts of [[computer science]], particularly [[programming]], as well as [[cognitive science]] in investigating the structure of [[mind]]. A '''module''' can be defined variously, but generally must be a component of a larger system, and operate within that system independently from the operations of the other components of the system.

==Modularity in Computer Science==

'''Modularity''' is the property of [[computer program]]s that measures the extent to which they have been composed out of separate parts called [[module (programming)|modules]].

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'''Modular programming''' techniques are those which increase modularity. (See also: [[structured programming]] and [[procedural programming]].)

==Modularity in Cognitive Science==

The question of whether mind is structured in a modular fashion is a prominent one in the [[cognitive science]]s. The extreme modular position, as articulated by [[Jerry Fodor]] in his 1983 Monograph ''The Modularity of Mind'', essentially argues that mind is composed of '''independent''', closed, '''___domain-specific''' processing modules governed by a central controlling module, similar to the main program of a modular computer program.

Other perspectives on modularity come from [[evolutionary psychology]], particularly from the work of [[Leda Cosmides]] and [[John Tooby]]. This perspective suggests that modules are units of mental processing that evolved in response to selection pressures. On this view, much modern human psychological activity is rooted in adaptations that occured earlier in [[human evolution]], when [[natural selection]] was forming the modern human species.

===Arguments Against Modularity===

In contrast to modular mental structure, some theories posit '''___domain-general''' processing, in which mental activity is distributed across the brain and cannot be decomposed, even abstractly, into independent units. A staunch defender of this view is [[William Uttal]], who argues in ''The New Phrenology'' (2003) that there are serious philosophical, theoretical, and methodological problems with the entire enterprise of trying to localize cognitive processes in the [[brain]]. Part of this argument is that a successful [[taxonomy]] of mental processes has yet to be developed.

==Works Cited==

Fodor, Jerry. (1983). ''Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology''. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Uttal, William R. (2003). ''The New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain.'' Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

==See also==

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* [[Encapsulation]]

* [[David Parnas]]

* [[Cognitive Science]]

* [[Evolutionary Psychology]]

[[Category:Software engineering]]

* [[Philosophy of Mind]]

* [[Jerry Fodor]]

* [[William Uttal]]

[[Category:Software engineering, Cognition]]