Modular Cognition Framework: Difference between revisions

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[[Modular Cognition Framework]]

The '''Modular Cognition Framework''' ('''MCF''') is an open-ended theoretical framework for research into the way the mind is organized. It draws on the common ground shared by contemporary research in the various areas that are collectively known as ''cognitive science'' and is designed to be applicable to all these fields of research. It was established, by Michael Sharwood Smith and John Truscott in the first decade of the 21st century with a particular focus on language cognition when it was known as the ''MOGUL framework'' (Modular Online Growth and Use of Language).

The MCF is an open-ended theoretical framework in the sense that it has a set of basic principles (see below) describing the architecture of the human mind: these amounts to setting out a ''skeleton model of the mind'' and providing a template for cognitive scientists to use. Both mind and brain are viewed as ''biological'' phenomena but at different levels of abstraction. These fundamental principles can be further interpreted in various ways by any researcher who is working with a theoretical approach that can be said to reflect, or can be aligned with themthe basic principles. In doing so researchers can identify their own hypotheses and research findings not only as confirming or challenging their own theory but also as a manifestation of the basic principles underlying all cognitive processing and representation. By the end of 2020 four books based specifically on the framework had been published along with over 35 articles and chapters as well as numerous publications and theses by researchers using the MCF framework for their own purposes had appeared.

By the end of 2020 four books based specifically on the framework had been published along with over 35 articles and chapters as well as numerous publications and theses by researchers using the MCF framework for their own purposes had appeared. This has built on the framework giving it a richer, more elaborate structure in those areas that have been investigated. Nonetheless, different version of the elaborations can still be proposed.

The predominant assumption of the MCF is that the mind is composed of a collaborative network of functionally specialized systems which have evolved over time together with their physical manifestations in the brain that reflect their abstract organization albeit in very different ways.

The predominant assumption of the MCF is that the mind is composed of a '''collaborative network of functionally specialized systems''' which have evolved over time together with their physical manifestations in the brain that reflect their abstract organization albeit in very different ways. Researchers working in very different areas of cognitive science ought to be able without difficulty to see each other's research as an elaboration of the same framework.

==Basic Principles==

1. '''Functional Specialisation'''. The mind has a modular architecture. This means it has a finite set of functional specialised cognitive systems such as the auditory system, the motor system and the conceptual system. These are manifested in the physical brain in various, often very different ways. This means that '''mind''' and '''brain''', though intimately related, still require ''distinctly different levels of description and explanation''.

2. '''Mind/Brain Relationship'''. Cognitive systems are manifested in the physical brain in various, often very different ways. This means that ''mind'' and ''brain'', though intimately related, still require ''distinctly different levels of description and explanation''.

2. Each system has its own unique operating principles such that its representations are formed in an identifiable manner and in ways that distinguish them for representations in any other system.

3. '''Representational Diversity'''. Each system has its own unique operating principles such that its representations are formed in an identifiable manner and in ways that distinguish them for representations in any other system. The structure onof any given representation is coded in such a way as to allow it to form more complex representations of the same kind, i.e. within its own system. ''Primitive'' representations in each system are the simplest and are provided in advance as part of our biological inheritance. In this way meaning (conceptual) representations can be combined with other conceptual representations to form more complex meanings.

4. '''Association'''. These cognitive systems form an interactive network allowing representations in one system to be associated with others in the network.

5. '''Coactivation'''. In response to current experience, associated representations across the mind as a whole are coactivated in parallel forming temporary online representational networks or ''schemas''.

6. '''Each Mind is Unique'''. The way in which combinations of representations of the ''same'' type are formed within a given system and the ways in which associations of representations of ''different'' types are formed over the lifetime of one individual make the mind of that individual unique. In other words, the fixed architecture of the mind still allows everyone to be different from everyone else and to respond to new experiences in different ways.

7. '''Information Encapsulation'''. Due to the different codes in which representations of various types are written, one cognitive system cannot share information with another cognitive system. Associated representations of different types can only be associated and coactivated during online processing.

8. '''Language versus Linguistic'''. Human '''language'' development and use iscomes reflectedfrom inproduct of the online interaction of ''all'' cognitive systems. butHowever, it qualifies as language by virtue of one, or two, depending the linguistic-theoretical perspective adopted, functionally specialized systems that have evolved specifically to handle ''linguistic'' structure.

9. '''Acquisition by Processing'''. Change (development, acquisition, attrition) occurs as a result of online processing. This principle is reflected in the following statement: ''acquisition is the lingering effect of processing'' (Truscott and Sharwood Smith 2004a) <ref>Truscott, J & M. Sharwood Smith. (2004a). Acquisition by processing: a modular perspective on language development. ''Bilingualism: Language and Cognition'' 7,1, 1-2. </ref>, (Truscott and Sharwood Smith 2004).<ref>Truscott, J & M. Sharwood Smith. (2004). How APT is your theory: present status and future prospects. ''Bilingualism: Language and Cognition'' 7,1,43-47.</ref>

10. '''Variable Activation Levels'''. Cognitive representations are activated online to different degrees and may compete with one another for participation in the building of a more complex representations online. This is partly because they possess a current '''resting level of activation''' which will rise or decline according to the frequency and regularity with which they are activated. Extremely high levels of activation are associated with phenomena described variously as ''attention'', '''awareness''' and ''consciousness''.

==Architecture==

Each functionally specialized system (''module'') has a common structure consisting of a '''store''' and a ''processor'''. This store/processor combination holds for all systems and is a simple, abstract version of what, in its neural manifestation, can involve multiple locations and pathways in the physical brain.

The processor is run according to the special operating principles of the given cognitive system as determined by the theory adopted by researchers in their relevant area of specialization. It controls the creation and combination online of its representations.

The store is where representations are housed at various ''resting levels of activation'' and where they are activated.

Any activated representation, complex or otherwise is said to be it that system's ''working memory''. In other words working memory is a ''state'' and not a system in its own right (<ref>Cowan 1999</ref> Cowan 1999). Working memory in a more general sense can be thought of as a combination of all the currently activated representation in their individual stores.

Any activated representation, complex or otherwise is said to be it that system's '''working memory'''. In other words working memory is a ''state'' and not a system in its own right (<ref>Cowan 1999</ref> Cowan 1999). Working memory in a more general sense can be thought of as a combination of all the currently activated representation in their individual stores.

Representations are also called (cognitive) ''structures'' and this is reflected in the abbreviations. Hence a visual representation is called a visual structure and abbreviated as ''VS''.

Cognitive systems are linked by ''interfaces'' which can be thought of as simple processors that enable the association and coactivation of representations in adjoining systems. The ''visual/auditory interface'', for example, links these two sensory perceptual systems and allows a visual representation to be associated and coactivated with a given auditory representation. Where a visual representation of, say, a tree is associated with the abstract meaning TREE, this would be explained as an association occurring between the visual and conceptual systems, i.e. across the VS/CS interface.

The set of cognitive systems can be conceptualised as consisting of two types. The first, forming an ''outer'' ring, consists of the set of ''perceptual'' systems that each receive a particular type of raw input (visual, auditory, olfactory etc) from the external environment via the senses and each produce as their output their own cognitive representations of the world outside. This means that the world that we feel we ''know'' as the ''external'' world is actually the world that is represented ''internally'' in our five perceptual systems.. Representations in these systems are collectively known as ''perceptual'' output structures ('''POpS'''. They are richly connected with one another and capable of very high activation levels necessary for survival. This makes them an essential part of how conscious experience is to be explained.

The second set of systems at an ''inner'' or ''deeper'' level are not connected directly with raw input coming in from the environment. They comprise the ''conceptual'' system responsible for abstract meanings, the ''affective'' system which is responsible for positive and negative values and basic emotions , the ''motor'' system and the ''spatial'' system. The final system or set of two systems are responsible for creating linguistic structure. The MCF currently uses the two-system alternative following Jackendoff <ref>Jackendoff, 1987, Jackendoff 2002.</ref>. are, respectively, the ''phonological'' system which associates specific auditory structures with ''phonological structures'' ('''PS''') and the ''syntactic'' system which associates ''syntactic representations'' ('''SS''') with meanings, i.e. conceptual structures ('''CS'''). Similarly, associations are also made between the two linguistic systems at the PS/SS interface. Inevitably the two linguistic systems are richly interconnected along with their direct connections with the conceptual and auditory system and also the visual system as well since it is currently assumed that ''sign language'' users make direct associations between visual representations ('''VS''') and representations in the phonological store hence making the phonological system do double duty (<ref>Sandler 2012</ref> Sandler 1999.

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* Baddeley, A. (2007). ''Working Memory, Thought, and Action''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

* Chomsky, N. (1965). ''Aspects of the Theory of Syntax''. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

* Chomsky, Noam. 1995. The Minimalist Program. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

* Cowan, N. (1999). "An Embedded-Processes Model of Working Memory" in A. Miyake & P. Shah (eds.). ''Models of Working Memory''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 63-101.

* Damasio, A. (1999). ''The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness''. Heinemann: London.

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* Jackendoff, R. (2002). ''Foundations of Language''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

* Paradis. (2004). ''A Neurolinguistic Theory of Bilingualism''. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

* Poeppel, D (2012). "The maps problem and the mapping problem: Two challenges for a cognitive neuroscience of speech and language". Cognitive Neuropsychology. 29(1-2):34-55.

* Truscott, J & M. Sharwood Smith. (2004) "Acquisition by Processing: a Modular Perspective on Language Development". ''Bilingualism: Language and Cognition'' 7,1, 1-2.