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|date=4 October 2006
| url = http://domino.watson.ibm.com/library/cyberdig.nsf/papers/AF8C220CB33D5A98852571FF00570458/$File/rj10390.pdf
|
|title = AACS Reference: Pre-recorded Video Book
|url = http://www.aacsla.com/specifications/specs091/AACS_Spec_Prerecorded_0.91.pdf
|
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20120206054929/http://www.aacsla.com/specifications/specs091/AACS_Spec_Prerecorded_0.91.pdf
|archive-date = 6 February 2012
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=== Volume IDs ===
Volume IDs are unique identifiers or [[serial number]]s that are stored on pre-recorded discs with special hardware. They cannot be duplicated on consumers' recordable media. The point of this is to prevent simple bit-by-bit copies, since the Volume ID is required (though not sufficient) for decoding content. On Blu-ray discs, the Volume ID is stored in the [[ROM-Mark|BD-ROM Mark]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.aacsla.com/specifications/AACS_Spec_BD_Prerecorded_0.912.pdf |title=Blu-ray Disc Pre-recorded Book |
To read the Volume ID, a cryptographic [[Public key certificate|certificate]] (the ''Private Host Key'') signed by the AACS LA is required. However, this has been circumvented by modifying the firmware of some HD DVD and Blu-ray drives.<ref name=arstechnica-aacs>{{cite web
|url=https://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070415-aacs-cracks-cannot-be-revoked-says-hacker.html
|title=New AACS cracks cannot be revoked, says hacker.
|
|first=Jeremy
|last=Reimer
|date=15 April 2007
|work=Ars Technica
|
|
|url-status=live
}}</ref><ref>{{cite web
|url = http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?t=124294
|title = Got VolumeID without AACS authentication :)
|
|author = Geremia
|date=4 April 2007
|work=Doom9.net forums|
=== Decryption process ===
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|url = http://www.aacsla.com/specifications/specs091/AACS_Spec_Common_0.91.pdf
|title = Advanced Access Content System (AACS): Introduction and Common Cryptographic Elements
|
|date = 17 February 2007
|work = AACS Licensing Administrator
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{{main|Image Constraint Token}}
AACS-compliant players must follow guidelines pertaining to outputs over analog connections. This is set by a flag called the Image Constraint Token (ICT), which restricts the resolution for analog outputs to 960×540. Full 1920×1080 resolution is restricted to HDMI or DVI outputs that support [[High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection|HDCP]]. The decision to set the flag to restrict output ("down-convert") is left to the content provider. Warner Pictures is a proponent of ICT, and it is expected that Paramount and Universal will implement down-conversion as well.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.videobusiness.com/article/CA6300812.html |title=High-def 'down-converting' forced |
AACS guidelines require that any title which implements the ICT must clearly state so on the packaging. The German magazine "Der Spiegel" has reported about an unofficial agreement between film studios and electronics manufacturers to not use ICT until 2010 – 2012.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060521-6880.html |title=Hollywood reportedly in agreement to delay forced quality downgrades for Blu-ray, HD DVD |
=== Audio watermarking ===
On 5 June 2009, the licensing agreements for AACS were finalized, which were updated to make [[Cinavia]] detection on commercial Blu-ray disc players a requirement.<ref>{{Cite press release | title = AACS Issues Final Agreements, Enabling Commercial Deployment of Cinavia in Blu-ray Disc Players | publisher = Verance | date = 5 June 2009 | url = http://www.verance.com/AdminSavR/news/news_item.php?news_id=42 |
===Managed Copy===
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| url = http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2005/051216a.html
| title =HP to Support HD-DVD High-definition DVD Format and Join HD-DVD Promotions Group
|
|
Possible scenarios for Managed Copy include (but are not limited to):
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|title=HD DVD, Blu-ray "Managed Copy" coming later this year
|work=arstechnica.com
|
|
In June 2009, the final AACS agreements were ratified and posted online, and include information on the Managed Copy aspects of AACS.
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== History ==
On 24 February 2001, Dalit Naor, Moni Naor and Jeff Lotspiech published a paper entitled "Revocation and Tracing Schemes for Stateless Receivers", where they described a broadcast encryption scheme using a construct called Naor-Naor-Lotspiech subset-difference trees. That paper laid the theoretical foundations of AACS.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.playfuls.com/news_05648_HD_DVDs_AACS_Protection_Bypassed_In_Only_8_Days.html |title=HD DVD's AACS Protection Bypassed. In Only 8 Days?! |
The AACS LA consortium was founded in 2004.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://archive.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2004/07/64212 |title=Can Odd Alliance Beat Pirates? |
|url = http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/jan05/2703
|title = Loser: DVD Copy Protection, Take 2
|
|author = Tekla S. Perry
|date = January 2007
|work = Spectrum Online
|
|
|url-status = dead
}}</ref>
The final AACS standard was delayed,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,123924-page,1/article.html |title=Toshiba Hints at HD-DVD Delay |
==Unlicensed decryption==
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| last = Drawbaugh
| title = BackupBluray available now too
|
|date=24 January 2007
| work = Engadget|
==Security==
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| work = TechAmok
|date=28 December 2006
|
| url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6301301.stm
| title = Hi-def DVD security is bypassed
|date=26 January 2007
|
|work=BBC news|
| last = Block
| first = Ryan
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| title = Blu-ray cracked too?
|date=20 January 2007
|
|work=Engadget |
| url = https://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/23/blu-ray_drm_cracked/
| first = John
Line 166:
| title = Blu-ray DRM defeated
|date=23 January 2007
|
Hackers also claim to have found Device Keys<ref>{{cite web
|url=http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?t=122664
|title=WinDVD 8 Device Key Found!
|
|author =ATARI Vampire
|date=24 February 2007
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|url=http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?t=122969
|title=PowerDVD private key
|
|author =jx6bpm
|date=3 March 2007
|work=Doom9.net forums|
(a key signed by the AACS LA used for hand-shaking between host and HD drive; required for reading the Volume ID). The first unprotected HD movies were available soon afterwards.<ref>
{{cite web
|url=http://www.dailytech.com/article.aspx?newsid=5747
|title=First Pirated HD DVDs Released
|
|first=Marcus
|last=Yam
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|archive-date=19 February 2007
|url-status=dead
}}
</ref>
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|url=http://www.chillingeffects.org/notice.cgi?sID=3218
|title=AACS licensor complains of posted key
|
Some sites that rely on user-submitted content, like [[Digg]] and Wikipedia, tried to remove any mentions of the key.<ref>{{cite news
|url=http://blog.wired.com/business/2007/05/wikipedia_locks.html
|title=Wikipedia Locks Out "The Number"
|last=Boutin
|
|date=1 May 2007
|work=Wired|
|title=Digg's DRM Revolt
|first=Andy
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|work=Forbes
|url=https://www.forbes.com/technology/2007/05/02/digital-rights-management-tech-cx_ag_0502digg.html
|
The Digg administrators eventually gave up trying to censor submissions that contained the key.<ref>{{cite news
|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6615047.stm
|title=DVD DRM row sparks user rebellion
|
|date=2 May 2007
|work=BBC news|
The AACS key extractions highlight the inherent weakness in any DRM system that permit software players for PCs to be used for playback of content. No matter how many layers of encryption are employed, it does not offer any true protection, since the keys needed to obtain the unencrypted content stream must be available somewhere in memory for playback to be possible. The PC platform offers no way to prevent memory snooping attacks on such keys, since a PC configuration can always be emulated by a [[virtual machine]], in theory without any running program or external system being able to detect the virtualization. The only way to wholly prevent attacks like this would require changes to the PC platform (see [[Trusted Computing]]) which could provide protection against such attacks. This would require that content distributors do not permit their content to be played on PCs without trusted computing technology, by not providing the companies making software players for non-trusted PCs with the needed encryption keys.
On 16 April 2007, the AACS consortium announced that it had expired certain encryption keys used by PC-based applications. Patches were available for WinDVD and PowerDVD which used new and uncompromised encryption keys.<ref>
{{cite web| url= http://www.aacsla.com/press/| title= Press Messages: AACS – Advanced Access Content System|
</ref><ref>
{{cite web
|url=http://dailytech.com/AACS+Responds+to+Cracked+HD+DVD+and+Bluray+Disc+Protections/article5879.htm
|title=AACS Responds to Cracked HD DVD and Blu-ray Disc Protections
|
|first=Marcus
|last=Yam
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|url=http://www.newsfactor.com/news/Blu-ray--HD-DVD-Encryption-Cracked/story.xhtml?story_id=121000E3UUOA
|title=Blu-ray and HD DVD Encryption Cracked
|
|author=Lindsay Martell
|date=26 January 2007
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|archive-date=3 November 2007
|url-status=dead
}}
</ref>
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|title=Illegal Offering of Title/Volume Keys to Circumvent AACS Copyright Protection: hdkeys.com
|format=pdf
|
|author =Alexander Kaplan
|date=5 April 2007
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|url=https://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070517-latest-aacs-revision-defeated-a-week-before-release.html
|title=Latest AACS revision defeated a week before release
|
|author =Ryan Paul
|date=7 May 2007
|work=Ars Technica
|
</ref>
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| title = Work Around for New DVD Format Protections
|date=7 June 2006
|
| work = [[Slashdot]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite web
| url = http://www.heise-online.co.uk/security/Copy-protection-hole-in-Blu-ray-and-HD-DVD-movies--/news/75103
|
| title = Copy protection hole in Blu-ray and HD DVD movies
|
|
|date=7 July 2006
| author = Edward Henning
Line 299 ⟶ 297:
|url=http://www.google.com/patents?id=rNoOAAAAEBAJ&dq=6,563,928
|title=Strengthened public key protocol
|
|author =Scott A. Vanstone
|date=1 April 1999
Line 308 ⟶ 306:
|url=http://www.google.com/patents?id=rZ0SAAAAEBAJ&dq=6704870
|title=Digital signatures on a Smartcard
|
|author =Scott A. Vanstone
|date=29 August 2001
Line 317 ⟶ 315:
|url=https://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070531-encryption-vendor-claims-aacs-infringes-its-patents-sues-sony.html
|title=Encryption vendor claims AACS infringes its patents, sues Sony
|
|author =Nate Anderson
|date=31 May 2007
|work=Ars Technica
|
</ref>
The lawsuit was dismissed on May 27, 2009.<ref>{{cite web
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| date=2009-05-27
| publisher=justia.com
|
==See also==
| |||