Power transition theory: Difference between revisions

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In general, hegemonic periods last approximately 60 to 90 years and conflicts which result in a period stabilization of power distribution last approximately 20 years.<ref name="Wittkopf"/> This can be explained through [[war-weariness]] and the tendency (although this was broken in the first half of the 20th century) for nations not to engage themselves in another conflict after being involved in a power transition.<ref name="Wittkopf"/>
 
Power transitions play an important role in applications of the [[bargaining model of war]] where wars are more likely to break out and be severe in situations of uncertainty and commitment problems. During power transitions, it is harder for actors to credibly commit to abide by any agreement, thus creating major commitment problems.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Powell|first=Robert|date=2006|title=War as a Commitment Problem|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818306060061|journal=International Organization|volume=60|issue=011|pages=|doi=10.1017/s0020818306060061|issn=0020-8183|via=}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite journalbook|last=Weisiger|first=Alex|date=2013|title=Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1xx5pk|journal=|language=en|publisher=Cornell University Press|volume=|pages=|doijstor=10.7591/j.ctt1xx5pk|isbn=9780801451867|via=}}</ref>
 
==See also==