Zero-configuration networking: Difference between revisions

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Following the failure of LLMNR to become an Internet standard and given that mDNS/DNS-SD is used much more widely than LLMNR, Apple was asked by the IETF to submit the mDNS/DNS-SD specs for publication as Informational RFC as well.{{citation needed|date=February 2016}}
 
In February 2013 mDNS and DNS-SD were published as Standards Track Proposals {{IETF RFC|6762}} and {{IETF RFC|6763}}.<!--[[User:Kvng/RTH]]-->
 
==Security issues==
Because mDNS operates under a different trust model than unicast DNS—trusting the entire network rather than a designated DNS server, it is vulnerable to [[spoofing attacksattack]]s by any system within the multicastsame IP[[broadcast range___domain]]. Like [[Simple Network Management Protocol|SNMP]] and many other network management protocols, it can also be used by attackers to quickly gain detailed knowledge of the network and its machines.<ref>{{Citation | url = http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/name-mdns-poisoning-attacks-inside-the-lan/ | title = Name (MDNS) Poisoning Attacks Inside the LAN | publisher = GNU citizen | type = World Wide Web log | date = 23 January 2008}}</ref> Because of this, applications should still authenticate and encrypt traffic to remote hosts (e.g. via [[RSA (cryptosystem)|RSA]], [[Secure Shell|SSH]], etc.) after discovering and resolving them through DNS-SD/mDNS. LLMNR suffers from similar vulnerabilityvulnerabilities.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/how-to-get-windows-to-give-you-credentials-through-llmnr/ |title=How to get Windows to give you credentials through LLMNR |first=David |last=Lodge |date=22 September 2015 |website=Pen Test Partners}}</ref><!--[[User:Kvng/RTH]]-->
 
==Major implementations==