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==Public-key vs. transient-key cryptography==
Both [[Public key|public-key]] and transient-key systems can be used to generate [[digital signature]]s that assert that a given piece of data has not changed since it was signed. But the similarities end there. In a traditional public key system, the public/private keypair is typically assigned to an individual, server, or [[organization]]. Data signed by a private key asserts that the signature came from the indicated source. Keypairs persist for years at a time, so the private component must be carefully guarded against disclosure; in a public-key system, anyone with access to a private key can counterfeit that person's digital signature.
In transient-key systems, however, the keypair is assigned to a brief interval of time, not to a particular person or entity. Data signed by a specific private key becomes associated with a specific time and date. A keypair is active only for a few minutes, after which the private key is permanently destroyed. Therefore, unlike public-key systems, transient-key systems do not depend upon the long-term security of the private keys.
==Establishing data integrity with transient-key timestamps==
In a transient-key system, the source of time must be a consistent standard understood by all senders and receivers. Since a local [[system clock]] may be changed by a user, it is never used as a source of time. Instead, data is digitally signed with a time value derived from [[Universal Coordinated Time|Universal Coordinated Time (UTC)]] accurate to within a millisecond, in accordance with the [[ANSI ASC X9.95 Standard|ANSI ASC X9.95 standard for Trusted Timestamping]]. Whenever a time interval in a transient-key system expires, a new public/private keypair is generated, and the private key from the previous interval is used to digitally certify the new public key. The old private key is then destroyed. This "key-chaining" system is the immediate ancestor of the [[Blockchain]] technology in vogue today.
For the new interval, time values are obtained from a trusted third-party source, and specific moments in time can be [[interpolated]] in between received times by using a time-biasing method based on the internal system timer. If a trusted time source cannot be obtained or is not running within specified [[Engineering tolerance|tolerances]], transient private keys are not issued. In that case, the time interval chain is terminated, and a fresh one is begun. The old and new chains are connected through network archives, which enable all servers to continue to verify the [[data integrity]] through time of protected data, regardless of how often the chain must be restarted.
The start times of the chain and of each interval can be coupled together to form an unbroken sequence of public keys, which can be used for the following:
* To irrefutably identify the time at which a set of data was signed.
* To identify the exact state of the data at the time it was signed.
As an extra security measure, all requests for signatures made during an interval are stored in a [[Data log|log]] that is [[concatenate]]d and is itself appended to the public key at the start of the next interval. This mechanism makes it impossible to insert new “signed events” into the interval chain after the fact.
==Cross-verification==
Through independently operating servers, '''cross-certification''' can provide third-party proof of the validity of a time interval chain and irrefutable evidence of consensus on the current time. Transient-key cryptographic systems display high [[Byzantine fault tolerance]]. A web of interconnected cross-certifying servers in a distributed environment creates a widely witnessed chain of trust that is as strong as its strongest link. By contrast, entire [[Hierarchy|hierarchies]] of traditional public key systems can be compromised if a single private key is exposed. ▼
An individual transient key interval chain can be cross-certified with other transient key chains and server instances. Through cross-certification, Server A signs Server B's interval chain, the signed data of which is the interval definition. In effect, the private keys from Server B are used to sign the public keys of Server A. In the diagram, a server instance is cross-certified with two other server instances (blue and orange).▼
[[Image:Cross-Certification.png|thumbnail|320px|A private key is cross-certified using two other transient-key servers.]]
▲Through independently operating servers, '''cross-certification''' can provide third-party proof of the validity of a time interval chain and irrefutable evidence of consensus on the current time. Transient-key cryptographic systems display high [[Byzantine fault tolerance]]. A web of interconnected cross-certifying servers in a distributed environment creates a widely witnessed chain of trust that is as strong as its strongest link. By contrast, entire [[Hierarchy|hierarchies]] of traditional public key systems can be compromised if a single private key is exposed.
▲An individual transient key interval chain can be cross-certified with other transient key chains and server instances. Through cross-certification, Server A signs Server B's interval chain, the signed data of which is the interval definition. In effect, the private keys from Server B are used to sign the public keys of Server A. In the diagram, a server instance is cross-certified with two other server instances (blue and orange). Cross-certification requires that the timestamp for the interval agree with the timestamp of the cross-certifying server within acceptable tolerances, which are user-defined and typically a few hundred milliseconds in duration.
==Network archives==
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Transient-key cryptography was invented in 1997 by Dr. Michael D. Doyle of [http://www.eolas.com Eolas Technologies Inc.] and later acquired by and productized by [http://www.proofspace.com ProofSpace, Inc]. It is protected under [https://patents.google.com/patent/US6381696B1/en US Patents #6,381,696], [https://patents.google.com/patent/US7017046/en 7,017,046], [https://patents.google.com/patent/US7047415/en 7,047,415], & [https://patents.google.com/patent/US7210035/en 7,210,035], and has been included in the [[ANSI ASC X9.95 Standard|ANSI ASC X9.95 standard for Trusted Timestamping]]. Transient-key cryptography is the predecessor to [[Forward secrecy]]. Despite the appearance that the [[Bitcoin]] [[blockchain (database)|blockchain]] technology was derived from Transient-key cryptography, Dr. Doyle has publicly denied he is [[Satoshi Nakamoto]].
*
==External links==
*[http://www.freepatentsonline.com/6381696.html US Patent #6,381,696]
*[https://cryptodetail.com/what-make-cryptocurrency-different-from-money Cryptocurrency Advantages]
*[https://investmenthoney.com/shiba-inu-crypto-buy-price-cost-of-cryptocurrency/ Shiba Inu Crypto Coin Details]
*[http://fios.com/proofmarksystemtech.pdf Technical Overview
*[http://www.techstreet.com/cgi-bin/detail?product_id=1327239 ANSI ASC X9.95 Standard for Trusted Time Stamps]
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