Probabilistic voting model: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 21:34, 15 May 2016

Revision as of 20:22, 7 September 2021

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Unlike the median voter theorem, what drives the equilibrium policy is both the numerosity and the density of social groups and not the median position of voters on a preference scale. This difference explains why social groups which have a great homogeneity of preferences are more politically powerful than those whose preferences are dispersed.

==Motivation and Applications==

[[Political economy]] and [[public economics]] are the main fields where the probabilistic voting theory is applied. In particular, it was used to explain [[public expenditure]] (Persson & Tabellini, 2000; Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten & Zilibotti, 2005), [[public debt]] dynamics (Song, Storesletten & Zilibotti, 2012), effect of mass media (Strömberg, 2004) [[social security]] systems (Profeta, 2002; Gonzalez Eiras & Niepelt, 2008) and taxation (Hettich & Winer, 2005; Canegrati, 2007).

Raphael Boleslavsky and Christopher Cotton (2015) show how the underlying uncertainty that candidates have about the preferences of voters may be the result of information revelation during campaigns, with more informative campaigns leading to greater ex ante uncertainty about election-day preferences. This in turn can increase policy divergence.

Probabilistic voting models are usually preferred to traditional [[Anthony Downs|Downsian]] median voter models, as in the former all voters have an influence on the policy outcome, whereas in the latter all power rests in the hands of the pivotal voter or group. For instance, in models where young and old (or rich and poor) voters have conflicting interests, probabilistic voting models predict that the winning candidate strikes a balance between the different interests in her/his policy platform. Due to the smooth mapping between the distribution of policy preferences and the political outcomes, this model has proven to be very tractable and convenient to use in dynamic models with repeated voting.

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Assar Lindbeck, and Jörgen W. Weibull (1987). "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition."

''Public Choice'', 52(3), 273-297273–297.

Raphael Boleslavsky and Christopher Cotton (2015). "Information and extremism in elections." ''American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.'' 7, 165-207

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Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (2000). ''Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy.'' Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Profeta, Paola (2002). "Retirement and Social Security in a Probabilistic Voting Model" ''International Tax and Public Finance'' 9, 331-348331–348.

Strömberg, David "Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy (2004)." ''Review of Economic Studies'' 71(1), 265-284265–284.

Song, Zheng, Kjetil Storeseletten, and Fabrizio Zilibotti (2012). "Rotten parents and disciplined children: A politico-economic theory of public expenditure and debt". ''Econometrica'' 80 (6), 2785–2803