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A second preimage attack (given a message <math>m_1</math> an attacker finds another message <math>m_2</math> to satisfy <math>\operatorname{hash}(m_1) = \operatorname{hash}(m_2)</math>) can be done according to Kelsey and Schneier<ref name="ks05"/> for a <math>2^k</math>-message-block message in time <math>k \times 2^{n/2+1} + 2^{n-k+1}</math>. Note that the complexity is above <math>2^{n/2}</math> but below <math>2^n</math> when messages are long, and that when messages get shorter the complexity of the attack approaches <math>2^n</math>.
== Hirose ==
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