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'''NetScreen Technologies''' was an American technology company that was acquired by [[Juniper Networks]] for [[US$]]4 billion stock for stock in 2004.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.networkworld.com/edge/news/2004/0209juniscreen.html|title=Juniper acquires NetScreen |date=2004-02-09 |publisher=networkworld.com|accessdate=2017-01-05}}</ref><ref name="jnprnetscreen">{{cite web|url=http://www.juniper.net/us/en/company/press-center/press-releases/2004/pr-040416.html|title=Juniper Networks Completes Acquisition of NetScreen Technologies and Appoints Frank J. Marshall to the Juniper Networks Board of Directors|date=April 16, 2004|publisher=Juniper Press Release|accessdate=2009-03-05}}</ref>
NetScreen Technologies developed [[Application-specific integrated circuit|ASIC]]-based Internet security systems and appliances that delivered high performance firewall, VPN and traffic shaping functionality to Internet data centers, e-business sites, broadband service providers and application service providers.
==History==
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Analysis of the firmware code in 2015 showed that a backdoor key could exist using [[Dual_EC_DRBG]]. This would enable whoever held that key to passively decrypt traffic encrypted by ScreenOS.<ref name="wired-secret-code-in-junipers-firewalls">{{cite web | url=https://www.wired.com/2015/12/juniper-networks-hidden-backdoors-show-the-risk-of-government-backdoors | title=Secret Code Found in Juniper's Firewalls Shows Risk of Government Backdoors | author=Kim Zetter | work=Wired | publisher=wired.com | language=English | date=2015-12-18 | accessdate=2017-01-05}}</ref>
In December 2015, Juniper Systems announced that they had discovered "unauthorized code" in the ScreenOS software that underlies their NetScreen devices, present from 2012 onwards. There were two vulnerabilities: One was a simple root password backdoor, and the other one was changing a point in Dual_EC_DRBG so that the attackers presumably had the key to use the
==References==
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