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Unsurprisingly, the study of hiding messages from others has been accompanied by the study of how to read such messages when one is ''not'' the intended receiver; this area of study is called ''[[cryptanalysis]]''. People involved in such work, and with cryptography in general, are known as cryptographers (or for those in the other school, '''cryptologists''').
The original information being sent is usually called the ''plaintext''. ''[[Encryption]]'' is the plaintext-to-garble conversion, and ''[[decryption]]'' is the garble-to-plaintext conversion. One main type of encryption is called ''[[code | encoding]]'' (yielding ''codetext''), after which the receiver decodes the codetext. The other is called ''[[cipher
Cryptography has four main goals, though they are nearly always concealed beneath a blanket of marketing speak in commercial products. Examining any proposed crypto system with these in mind, and ignoring the marketing blather, will be a very useful exercise in the real world. They are:
# message ''confidentiality:'' Only the authorised recipient should be able to extract the contents of the message from its encrypted form. In addition, it should not be possible to obtain information about the message contents (such as a statistical distribution of certain characters) as this makes cryptanalysis easier.
# message ''integrity:'' The recipient should be able to determine if the message has been altered during transmission.
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:1) a computer program on a local system,
:2) a computer program on a 'nearby' system which 'provides security services' for users on other nearby systems,
:3) or -- what most people assume is "obviously" meant -- a human being using some computer system. Even in this case, the human
When confusion on these points is present (at the design stage, during implementation, or by a user), unintended failures in reaching each of the stated goals can occur quite easily, often without notice to any human involved, and even given perfect algorithms, superb and provably secure system design, and error free implementation. Such failures are most often due to extra-cryptographic issues; each such failure demonstrates that good algorithms and good protocols alone do not provide 'security'. Instead, careful thought is required regarding the entire system design -- and too often, this is absent in practice with real-world crypto systems.
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