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3. SYMBOL (a.k.a. general sign*) = sign that denotes its object solely by virtue of the fact that it ''will be'' interpreted to do so. The symbol does not depend on having any resemblance or actual connection to the denoted object but is fundamentally conventional, so that the signifying relationship must be learned and agreed upon (e.g. the word “cat”). A symbol thus denotes, primarily, by virtue of its <EM>interpretant</EM>. Its sign-action (<EM>semeiosis</EM>) is ruled by a convention, a more or less systematic set of associations that ensures its interpretation. For Peirce, every symbol is a general, and that which we call an actual individual symbol (e.g., on the page) is called by Peirce a replica OF the symbol or, more strictly, a replica OF a legisign (type, etc.) which is the symbol.
 
&nbsp;*''Note:'' in "On a New List of Categories" (1867) Peirce gave the unqualified term "sign" as an alternate expression for "index," and gave "general sign" as an alternate expression for "symbol." At that time "representamen" was his preferred blanket term for any and every sign.</blockquote> Peirce eventually decided that the symbol is not the only "general" sign and that indices and icons can be general, too. The general sign, as such, he eventually called the "legisign" or "type."
 
<H5>III. Rheme, dicisign, delome (a.k.a. term, proposition, argument)</H5>