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It is asserted by proponents that DCAS provides greater security for the cable industry because it allows them to change their entire security structure by downloading new software into host devices. If a particular encryption algorithm is cracked, it can be replaced by another one. Detractors note that if the physical circuitry is compromised, that it may not be replaced as is the case with CableCARDs. Some DCAS scenarios do use removable cards: OCAP-based devices may incorporate internal support for a kind of "[[smart card]]" (similar to the current [[Subscriber Identity Module|SIM]] chip in a [[Global System for Mobile Communications|GSM]] cell-phone) to identify the subscriber and provide further protection. Proponents assert that DCAS is more supportable since DCAS devices would not require a qualified technician to install the card. Detractors assert that the final version of DCAS may require a physical card insertion, and that technicians are not required to insert CableCARDs anyway, since they are merely the same kind of cards that consumers routinely insert in their laptops. It is asserted that if Cable companies are finally forced to agree on a standard for two way communication that Cablecards will be able to be remotely configured as would be the case with DCAS devices.
The appearance of DCAS as a possible future technology has been used as a reason that the FCC should release cable companies from obligations regarding CableCards. [[Verizon FiOS]] wishes to be released from having to support cablecards at all on its network. Cable companies point to DCAS as a reason that they should
== See also ==
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