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Regarding Lerdahl's statement "Comprehension takes place when the perceiver is able to assign a precise mental representation to what is perceived", Amy Bauer responded: "I would like to ask why this mental representation necessarily equates with a grasp of the work's compositional grammar. I also question the corresponding implication that reception of a work is deficient if not founded on conscious perception of this structure". She goes on to "question the corresponding implication that reception of a work is deficient if not founded on conscious perception of this structure", and argues that "to 'hear the sounds as music' is never restricted to parsing a work's concrete, self-referential details, but relies on the necessary mediation of metaphor... Any theory of listening to modernist music must rely not only on conceptual mappings from the temporal to the spatial realm, but on metaphoric projections and connections between music and other experiential domains" ([[#Bauer2004|Bauer 2004, 122]]).
Walter Horn wrote:
For additional opinions and discussion, see [[#Boros1995|Boros 1995]], [[#Boros1996|Boros 1996]], [[#Denham2009|Denham 2009]], [[#Dibben1996|Dibben 1996]], [[#Heinemann1993|Heinemann 1993]], [[#Heinemann1998|Heinemann 1998]], [[#Horn2015|Horn 2015]], and [[#Mosch2004|Mosch 2004]].▼
<blockquote>Lerdahl does not suggest that he can prove any... correlations between aesthetic value and ease of comprehension as, for example, ''Too Easy: Bad; Too Hard: Also Bad; Moderately Difficult: Just Right''. Instead, he concedes that his aesthetic judgments rely on unproven and unprovable axioms such as: "The best music utilizes the full potential of our cognitive resources." But why should anyone expect any such axiom to be true? Perhaps only the most "advanced" listener can plumb the depths of some complicated and multiply referential work, just as only a very wise person might be able to find a way out of some complex moral quandary. But why infer from this that the complicated piece must therefore be better than all simpler ones? We would surely not infer that a carefully modulated virtuous action must be morally superior to simple acts of good will that do not require the acuity of a Trollope to negotiate. Excellence in both arenas, while certainly consistent with complexity, does not seem to require it ([[#Horn2015|Horn 2015, 212]]).</blockquote>
▲For additional opinions and discussion, see [[#Boros1995|Boros 1995]], [[#Boros1996|Boros 1996]], [[#Denham2009|Denham 2009]], [[#Dibben1996|Dibben 1996]], [[#Heinemann1993|Heinemann 1993]], [[#Heinemann1998|Heinemann 1998
== Sources ==
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