Air data inertial reference unit: Difference between revisions

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Made corrections to the description of the design and operation of the Boeing 777 ADIRS
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|publisher=Air Safety Week
|date=August 14, 2006
}}</ref> An ADIRU acts asis a single, [[fault-tolerant design|fault tolerant]] source of attitude, air data and navigational data for both pilots of an aircraft.<ref name="art2">
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This device is used on various [[military aircraft]] as well as civilian [[airliner]]s starting with the [[Airbus A320]]<ref name="art3">
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==Description==
An ADIRS consists of upa to threesingle [[fault-tolerant design|fault tolerant]] ADIRUsADIRU located in the aircraft electronic rack, anA associatedSAARU controllocated and display unit (CDU) in the cockpitnearby, and remotely mounted [[air data module]]s (ADMs).<ref name="art1">
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</ref> The No 3777 ADIRU is a [[Redundancy (engineering)|redundant]] unit that may be selected to supply data to eitherboth the commander's orand the co-pilot's displays in the event of a partial or complete failure of eithermultiple theinternal Nocomponents 1of or No 2the ADIRU. There is no cross-channel redundancy betweenmanagement thein Nosany 1of andthe 2ADIRU's ADIRUs,user assystems Noand 3the ADIRUSAARU is the only alternate source of air and inertial reference data. An inertial reference (IR) fault in ADIRU No 1 or 2 will cause a loss of [[Angle of attack|attitude]] and navigation information on their associated [[EFIS#Primary flight display (PFD)|primary flight display]] (PFD) and navigation display (ND) screens. An air data reference (ADR) fault will cause the loss of airspeed and altitude information on the affected display. In either case the information can only be restored by selecting the No 3 ADIRU.<ref name="art5" />
 
Each ADIRU comprises an air data reference (ADR) and an inertial reference (IR) component.<ref name="urlA330 - Navigation">{{cite web|publisher=smartcockpit.com |url=http://www.smartcockpit.com/pdf/plane/airbus/A330/systems/0019/ |archive-url=https://archive.today/20070115043457/http://www.smartcockpit.com/pdf/plane/airbus/A330/systems/0019/ |url-status=dead |archive-date=15 January 2007 |title=Airline training guides, Aviation, Operations, Safety -Navigation A330 |access-date=12 June 2009 }}</ref>
 
===Air data reference===
{{See also|Pitot-static system}}
The air data reference (ADR) component of an ADIRU provides airspeed, [[Mach number]], angle of attack, temperature and barometric altitude data. Both the ADIRU and the SAARU transmit voted, high-integrity air data to all user systems<ref name="aero-08">
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==Complexity in redundancy==
Analysis of complex systems is itself so difficult as to be subject to errors in the certification process. Complex interactions between flight computers and ADIRU's can lead to counter-intuitive behaviour for the crew in the event of a failure. In
However the case of [[Qantas Flight 72]], the captain switched the source of IR data from ADIRU1 to ADIRU3 following a failure of ADIRU1; however ADIRU1ADIRU continued to supply ADR data to the captain's primary flight display. In addition, the master flight control computer (PRIM1) was switched from PRIM1 to PRIM2, then PRIM2 back to PRIM1, thereby creating a situation of uncertainty for the crew who did not know which redundant systems they were relying upon.<ref name="harmful">
{{cite web |url=http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/ISSC09/ADIRU_Accident_Submission.pdf |title=The Dangers of Interaction with Modular and Self-Healing Avionics Applications: Redundancy Considered Harmful |author1=C.W. Johnson |author2=C. Michael Holloway |date=2 February 2009 |access-date=8 June 2009}}</ref>