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In this sections it is claimed "The traditional form of the algorithm is optimal for the initiator of the proposals and the stable, suitor-optimal solution may or may not be optimal for the reviewer of the proposals.".
I am not sure this is sufficiently clear. In fact it seems quite misleading. If the initiators (suitors) do not collude, in some cases they end up strictly worse off if the follow the letter of the algorithm. So it is in their interest to agree to lie about their preferences so that they all get better outcomes. <small><span class="autosigned">— Preceding [[Wikipedia:Signatures|unsigned]] comment added by [[User:Mircea85|Mircea85]] ([[User talk:Mircea85|talk]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mircea85|contribs]]) 01:56, 1 August 2015 (UTC)</span></small><!-- Template:Unsigned --> <!--Autosigned by SineBot-->
== Other Algorithms? ==
The Gale-Shapley method seems pretty lopsided. Aren't there other algorithms known, particularly ones that treat both groups symmetrically? It doesn't seem too difficult to think of one. For instance, one method would be: (a) sort all pairs of uncommitted individuals in decreasing order of mutual preference (e.g. one if A has a #m on their list, and a has A as #n on their list, then the total preference might be m + n or some other monotonic symmetric function of m and n); and set up a tie-breaking convention to handle ties (or select amongst ties randomly); (b) find the first stable pair on the list and commit the individuals to each other; (c) repeat (a) for the remaining uncommitted individuals. By construction, the result is stable; and the method is symmetric, subject to the symmetry of the tie-breaking convention.
== Uniqueness of solution ==
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