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{{see also|Technological singularity#Criticisms}}
Some critics believe that both human-level AI and superintelligence are unlikely, and that therefore friendly AI is unlikely. Writing in ''[[The Guardian]]'', Alan Winfield compares human-level artificial intelligence with faster-than-light travel in terms of difficulty, and states that while we need to be "cautious and prepared" given the stakes involved, we "don't need to be obsessing" about the risks of superintelligence.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Winfield|first1=Alan|title=Artificial intelligence will not turn into a Frankenstein's monster|url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/10/artificial-intelligence-will-not-become-a-frankensteins-monster-ian-winfield|access-date=17 September 2014|work=[[The Guardian]] |date=9 August 2014}}</ref> Boyles and Joaquin, on the other hand, argue that Luke Muehlhauser and [[Nick Bostrom]]’s proposal to create friendly AIs appear to be bleak. This is because Muehlhauser and Bostrom seem to hold the idea that intelligent machines could be programmed to think counterfactually about the moral values that humans beings would have had.<ref name=think13 /> In an article in ''[[AI & Society]]'', Boyles and Joaquin maintain that such AIs would not be that friendly considering the following: the infinite amount of antecedent counterfactual conditions that would have to be programmed into a machine, the difficulty of cashing out the set of moral values—that is, those that a more ideal than the ones human beings possess at present, and the apparent disconnect between counterfactual antecedents and ideal value consequent.<ref name=boyles2019 />
Some philosophers claim that any truly "rational" agent, whether artificial or human, will naturally be benevolent; in this view, deliberate safeguards designed to produce a friendly AI could be unnecessary or even harmful.<ref>{{cite journal | last=Kornai | first=András | title=Bounding the impact of AGI | journal=Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence | publisher=Informa UK Limited | volume=26 | issue=3 | date=2014-05-15 | issn=0952-813X | doi=10.1080/0952813x.2014.895109 | pages=417–438 | s2cid=7067517 |quote=...the essence of AGIs is their reasoning facilities, and it is the very logic of their being that will compel them to behave in a moral fashion... The real nightmare scenario (is one where) humans find it advantageous to strongly couple themselves to AGIs, with no guarantees against self-deception.}}</ref> Other critics question whether it is possible for an artificial intelligence to be friendly. Adam Keiper and Ari N. Schulman, editors of the technology journal ''[[The New Atlantis (journal)|The New Atlantis]]'', say that it will be impossible to ever guarantee "friendly" behavior in AIs because problems of ethical complexity will not yield to software advances or increases in computing power. They write that the criteria upon which friendly AI theories are based work "only when one has not only great powers of prediction about the likelihood of myriad possible outcomes, but certainty and consensus on how one values the different outcomes.<ref>{{cite
==See also==
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