Advanced Access Content System: Difference between revisions

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{{For|other AACS uses|AACS (disambiguation){{!}}AACS}}
{{short description|Standard for content distribution and digital rights management}}
{{For|other AACS uses|AACS (disambiguation){{!}}AACS}}
{{Update|date=August 2017}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=February 2020}}
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|date=26 January 2007
|access-date=2 May 2007
|work=BBC newsNews| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20070505121314/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6301301.stm| archive-date= 5 May 2007 | url-status= live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web
| last = Block
| first = Ryan
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|access-date = 2 May 2007
|date=2 May 2007
|work=BBC newsNews| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20070516215800/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6615047.stm| archive-date= 16 May 2007 | url-status= live}}</ref>
 
The AACS key extractions highlight the inherent weakness in any DRM system that permit software players for PCs to be used for playback of content. No matter how many layers of encryption are employed, it does not offer any true protection, since the keys needed to obtain the unencrypted content stream must be available somewhere in memory for playback to be possible. The PC platform offers no way to prevent memory snooping attacks on such keys, since a PC configuration can always be emulated by a [[virtual machine]], in theory without any running program or external system being able to detect the virtualization. The only way to wholly prevent attacks like this would require changes to the PC platform (see [[Trusted Computing]]) which could provide protection against such attacks. This would require that content distributors do not permit their content to be played on PCs without trusted computing technology, by not providing the companies making software players for non-trusted PCs with the needed encryption keys.