Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol: Difference between revisions

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MS-CHAPv2 weakness citation
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A CA certificate must be used at each client to authenticate the server to each client before the client submits authentication credentials. If the CA certificate is not validated, in general it is trivial to introduce a fake Wireless Access Point which then allows gathering of [[MS-CHAPv2]] handshakes.<ref name="Man-in-the-Middle in Tunneled Authentication Protocols">{{cite web|title=Man-in-the-Middle in Tunneled Authentication Protocols|url=//eprint.iacr.org/2002/163.pdf|publisher=Nokia Research Center|accessdate=14 November 2013}}</ref>
 
Several weaknesses have been found in MS-CHAPv2, some of which severely reduce the complexity of brute-force attacks making them feasible with modern hardware.<ref>{{CitationCite web needed|date=November 2016-03-16 |title=Divide and Conquer: Cracking MS-CHAPv2 with a 100% success rate |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160316174007/https://www.cloudcracker.com/blog/2012/07/29/cracking-ms-chap-v2/ |access-date=2022-10-19 |website=web.archive.org}}</ref>
 
== PEAPv1 with EAP-GTC ==