Perceptual control theory: Difference between revisions

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If the speed of the car starts to drop below the goal-speed, for example when climbing a hill, the small increase in the error signal, amplified, causes engine output to increase, which keeps the error very nearly at zero. If the speed begins to exceed the goal, e.g. when going down a hill, the engine is throttled back so as to act as a brake, so again the speed is kept from departing more than a barely detectable amount from the goal speed (brakes being needed only if the hill is too steep). The result is that the cruise control system maintains a speed close to the goal as the car goes up and down hills, and as other disturbances such as wind affect the car's speed. This is all done without any planning of specific actions, and without any blind reactions to stimuli. Indeed, the cruise control system does not sense disturbances such as wind pressure at all, it only senses the controlled variable, speed. Nor does it control the power generated by the engine, it uses the 'behavior' of engine power as its means to control the sensed speed.
 
The same principles of negative feedback control (including the ability to nullify effects of unpredictable external or internal disturbances) apply to living control systems.<ref name=Wiener48/> Implications of these principle are e.g. intensively studied by [[Biological cybernetics|biological]] and [[Medical cybernetics|medical cybernetics]] and [[Systems biology|systems biology]].
 
The thesis of PCT is that animals and people do not control their behavior; rather, they vary their behavior as their means for controlling their perceptions, with or without external disturbances. This is harmoniously consistent with the historical and still widespread assumption that behavior is the final result of stimulus inputs and cognitive plans.<ref name=Marken2009rev/><ref>{{cite book| last =Miller| first =George| author2 =Galanter, Eugene| author3 =Pribram, Karl| title =Plans and the structure of behavior| publisher =[[Holt, Rinehart and Winston]]| year =1960| ___location =[[New York City|New York]]| isbn =978-0-03-010075-8| url =https://archive.org/details/plansstructureo00mill}}</ref>
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Perceptions, in PCT, are constructed and controlled in a hierarchy of levels. For example, visual perception of an object is constructed from differences in light intensity or differences in sensations such as color at its edges. Controlling the shape or ___location of the object requires altering the perceptions of sensations or intensities (which are controlled by lower-level systems). This organizing principle is applied at all levels, up to the most abstract philosophical and theoretical constructs.
 
The Russian physiologist [[Nikolai Bernstein|Nicolas Bernstein]]<ref>Bernstein, Nicolas. 1967. ''Coordination and regulation of movements''. New York: Pergamon Press.</ref> independently came to the same conclusion that behavior has to be multiordinal—organized hierarchically, in layers. A simple problem led to this conclusion at about the same time both in PCT and in Bernstein's work. The spinal reflexes act to stabilize limbs against disturbances. Why do they not prevent centers higher in the brain from using those limbs to carry out behavior? Since the brain obviously does use the spinal systems in producing behavior, there must be a principle that allows the higher systems to operate by incorporating the reflexes, not just by overcoming them or turning them off. The answer is that the reference value (setpoint) for a spinal reflex is not static; rather, it is varied by higher-level systems as their means of moving the limbs ([[Servomechanism|servomechanism]]). This principle applies to higher feedback loops, as each loop presents the same problem to subsystems above it.
 
Whereas an engineered control system has a reference value or [[Setpoint (control system)|setpoint]] adjusted by some external agency, the reference value for a biological control system cannot be set in this way. The setpoint must come from some internal process. If there is a way for behavior to affect it, any perception may be brought to the state momentarily specified by higher levels and then be maintained in that state against unpredictable disturbances. In a hierarchy of control systems, higher levels adjust the goals of lower levels as their means of approaching their own goals set by still-higher systems. This has important consequences for any proposed external control of an autonomous living control system (organism). At the highest level, reference values (goals) are set by heredity or adaptive processes.
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Perceptual control theory has not been widely accepted in mainstream psychology, but has been effectively used in a considerable range of domains<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume-28/november-2015/perceptual-control-revolution |title = A perceptual control revolution? |website=The Psychologist}}</ref><ref name="IJHCS">The June 1999 Issue of ''The International Journal of Human-Computer Studies'' contained papers ranging from tracking through cockpit layout to self-image and crowd dynamics.</ref> in human factors,<ref name="CBUT">PCT lies at the foundation of [[Component-Based Usability Testing]].</ref> clinical psychology, and psychotherapy (the "[[Method of Levels]]"), it is the basis for a considerable body of research in sociology,<ref>For example: McClelland, Kent A. and Thomas J. Fararo, eds. 2006, ''Purpose, Meaning and Action: Control Systems Theories in Sociology'', New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (McClelland is co-author of Chapter 1, "Control Systems Thinking in Sociological Theory," and author of Chapter 2, "Understanding Collective Control Processes."). McClelland, Kent, 2004, "Collective Control of Perception: Constructing Order from Conflict", ''International Journal of Human-Computer Studies'' 60:65-99. McPhail, Clark. 1991, ''The myth of the madding crowd'' New York: Aldine de Gruyter.</ref> and it has formed the conceptual foundation for the reference model used by a succession of [[NATO]] research study groups.<ref name="IST">volume-28november-2015 Reports of these groups are available from the [[NATO Research and Technology Administration]] publications page: {{cite web |url=http://www.rta.nato.int/Abstracts.aspx |title=NATO Research & Technology Organisation Scientific Publications |access-date=2010-05-15 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100623055236/http://www.rta.nato.int/abstracts.aspx |archive-date=2010-06-23 }}> under the titles RTO-TR-030, RTO-TR-IST-021, and RTO-TR-IST-059.</ref> It is being taught in several universities worldwide and is the subject of a number of PhD dissertations.<ref>{{cite web |last=Heylighen |first=Francis |title=The Economy as a Distributed, Learning Control System |url=http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Papers/MarketCo.html}}</ref>
 
Recent approaches use principles of perceptual control theory to provide new algorithmic foundations for [[artificial intelligence]] and [[machine learning]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Monaco |first1=Joseph D. |last2=Hwang |first2=Grace M. |title=Neurodynamical Computing at the Information Boundaries of Intelligent Systems |journal=Cognitive Computation |date=27 December 2022 |doi=10.1007/s12559-022-10081-9}}</ref>.
 
==Selected bibliography==