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An example of a causal loop paradox involving information is given by Allan Everett: suppose a time traveler copies a mathematical proof from a textbook, then travels back in time to meet the mathematician who first published the proof, at a date prior to publication, and allows the mathematician to simply copy the proof. In this case, the information in the proof has no origin.<ref name="Everett"/> A similar example is given in the television series ''[[Doctor Who]]'' of a hypothetical time-traveler who copies Beethoven's music from the future and publishes it in Beethoven's time in Beethoven's name.<ref>{{cite web|last=Holmes|first=Jonathan|work=Radio Times|url=http://www.radiotimes.com/news/2015-10-10/doctor-who-what-is-the-bootstrap-paradox|title=Doctor Who: what is the Bootstrap Paradox?|date=October 10, 2015}}</ref> Everett gives the movie ''[[Somewhere in Time (film)|Somewhere in Time]]'' as an example involving an object with no origin: an old woman gives a watch to a playwright who later travels back in time and meets the same woman when she was young, and gives her the same watch that she will later give to him.<ref name="Everett" />
[[Sergey Krasnikov]] writes that these bootstrap paradoxes – information or an object looping through time – are the same; the primary apparent paradox is a physical system evolving into a state in a way that is not governed by its laws.<ref name="Krasnikov2001">{{citation|last=Krasnikov|first=S.|year=2001|title=The time travel paradox|journal=Phys. Rev. D|volume=65|issue=6|page=06401 |arxiv=gr-qc/0109029|bibcode = 2002PhRvD..65f4013K |doi = 10.1103/PhysRevD.65.064013 |s2cid=18460829}}</ref>{{Rp|4}} He does not find this paradoxical, and attributes problems regarding the validity of time travel to other factors in the interpretation of general relativity.<ref name="Krasnikov2001" />{{Rp|14–16}}
A 1992 paper by physicists Andrei Lossev and [[Igor Dmitriyevich Novikov|Igor Novikov]] labeled such items without origin as ''Jinn'', with the singular term ''Jinnee''.<ref name="Lossev1992">{{cite journal|last1=Lossev|first1=Andrei|last2=Novikov|first2=Igor|date=15 May 1992|title=The Jinn of the time machine: non-trivial self-consistent solutions|journal=Class. Quantum Gravity|volume=9|issue=10|pages=2309–2321|url=http://thelifeofpsi.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Lossev-Novikov-1992.pdf|doi=10.1088/0264-9381/9/10/014|bibcode=1992CQGra...9.2309L|s2cid=250912686 |access-date=16 November 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117014658/http://thelifeofpsi.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Lossev-Novikov-1992.pdf|archive-date=17 November 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref>{{Rp|2311–2312}} This terminology was inspired by the [[Jinn]] of the [[Quran]], which are described as leaving no trace when they disappear.<ref name="Toomey2012" />{{Rp|200–203}} Lossev and Novikov allowed the term "Jinn" to cover both objects and information with reflexive origin; they called the former "Jinn of the first kind", and the latter "Jinn of the second kind".<ref name="Everett" /><ref name="Lossev1992" />{{Rp|2315–2317}}<ref name="Toomey2012" />{{Rp|208}} They point out that an object making circular passage through time must be identical whenever it is brought back to the past, otherwise it would create an inconsistency; the [[second law of thermodynamics]] seems to require that the object tends to a lower energy state over the course of its history, and such objects that are identical in repeating points in their history seem to contradict this, but Lossev and Novikov argued that since the second law only requires entropy to increase in ''closed'' systems, a Jinnee could interact with its environment in such a way as to regain "lost" entropy.<ref name="Everett" /><ref name="Toomey2012" />{{Rp|200–203}} They emphasize that there is no "strict difference" between Jinn of the first and second kind.<ref name="Lossev1992" />{{Rp|2320}} Krasnikov equivocates between "Jinn", "self-sufficient loops", and "self-existing objects", calling them "lions" or "looping or intruding objects", and asserts that they are no less physical than conventional objects, "which, after all, also could appear only from either infinity, or a singularity."<ref name="Krasnikov2001" />{{Rp|8–9}}
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