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[[Unix permissions]] permit different users access to a file. Different ''user groups'' have different permissions on a file.
More advanced Unix filesystems include the ''Access Control List'' concept which allows permissions to be granted to multiple users or groups. An ''Access Control List'' may be used to grant permission to additional individual users or groups. For example:
/pvr [u::rwx,g::r-x,o::r-x/u::rwx,u:sue:rwx,g::r-x,m::rwx,o::r-x]
===User groups===
Users under Unix style operating systems often belong to managed groups with specific access permissions. This enables users to be grouped by the level of access they have to this system. Many Unix implementations add an additional layer of security by requiring that a user be a member of the ''[[Wheel (computing)|wheel]]'' [[Group identifier (Unix)|user privileges group]] in order to access the <code>su</code> command.<ref name=levi>{{cite book|title=UNIX Administration: A Comprehensive Sourcebook for Effective Systems and Network Management |first=Bozidar |last=Levi |publisher=CRC Press |year=2002 |pages=207 |isbn=0-8493-1351-1}}</ref>
===Root access===
Most Unix and Unix-like systems have an account or group which enables a user to exact complete control over the system, often known as a [[Superuser|root]] account. If access to this account is gained by an unwanted user, this results in a complete breach of the system. A root account however is necessary for administrative purposes, and for the above security reasons the root account is ''seldom'' used for day to day purposes (the [[sudo]] program is more commonly used), so usage of the root account can be more closely monitored.
Root access "as it should be" can be visualisedvisualized by those familiar with the [[Superman]] stories using the following [[analogy]]:
::Using a root account is rather like being Superman; an administrator's regular user is more like Clark Kent. Clark Kent becomes Superman for only as long as necessary, in order to save people. He then reverts to his "disguise". Root access should be used in the same fashion. The Clark Kent disguise doesn't really restrict him though, as he is still able to use his super powers. This is analogous to using the sudo program.
===Passwords===
Selecting a strong [[password]] and guarding it properly are probably the most important things a user can do to improve Unix security.
In Unix systems, the essential information about users is stored under the file <code>[[Passwd (file)|/etc/passwd]]</code>This file keeps track of the users registered in the system and their main definitions. Passwords, or more correctly, the hash of the password, can also be stored in the same place. The entries in <code>/etc/passwd</code> occupy exactly one line each, and have the following form:
nickname:password_hash:UserID:GroupID:Complete_Name:home_dir:shell_bin
An example would be:
{{sxhl|2=unixconfig|xfze:$$1zuW2nX3sslp3qJm9MYDdglEApAc36r/:1000:100:Daniel Ernesto Ortiz Costa:/home/xfze:/bin/bash}}
Since all users must have read access to the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file to do many common tasks (<code>ls -l /home</code> will use <code>/etc/passwd</code> to map UIDs to login names for example), anyone could also read the password hashes of other users. To solve this problem, the file <code>[[password shadowing|/etc/shadow]]</code> was created to store the password hashes, with only [[root]] having read access. Under password shadowing, the 2nd field ([[key derivation function|password hash]]) is replaced by an 'x' which tells the system to retrieve the corresponding user's password via the <code>/etc/shadow</code> file.
The <code>/etc/shadow</code> file often only contains values for the first two fields:
===Patching===
Operating systems, like all software, may contain bugs in need of fixing or may be enhanced with the addition of new features. Patching the operating system in a secure manner requires that the software come from a trustworthy source and not have been altered since it was packaged. Common methods for verifying that operating system patches have not been altered include the use of the [[digital signature]] of a [[cryptographic hash]], such as a [[SHA-2|SHA-256]] based checksum, or the use of read-only media.
From a security standpoint, the specific packaging method, such as the [[Dpkg|dpkg package manager]] or the [[RPM Package Manager]] format originally from [[Debian]] and [[Red Hat Linux]], respectively is not as important as the use of features which ensure the integrity of the patch itself.
====Source distributions====
Source distributions include the ability to examine the code for suspicious content. The drawback, absent an accompanying cryptographic hash value, is that the user must be able to perform a security analysis of the code themselves.
====RPM packages====
[[Linux]] distributions which use the [[RPM Package Manager]] format for providing base functionality and software updates make use of [[MD5|cryptographic hash]]<nowiki/>es and [[GNU Privacy Guard|GPG]] to ensure content integrity. The hash values are packaged with the RPM file and verified when the package is installed.
====Debian packages====
[[Linux]] distributions which use the [[Debian]] [[Deb (file format)|.deb package format]] for providing base functionality and software updates make use of [[GNU Privacy Guard|GPG]] signatures to ensure content integrity. A signature is computed when the package is constructed and verified later when the package is installed.
====Other vendors and distributions====
==Services==
Unnecessary system software should not be installed or configured on a system. Software which is no longer required should be removed completely, if possible.
*Identify what services are running
*using ''rc-update'' on [[Gentoo Linux]]
This approach is usually called ''proactive security''. There are some operating systems which are ''secure by default''., such Amongst others,as the free BSD flavours ([[FreeBSDBSD]], [[NetBSD]],operating and [[OpenBSD]]) are proactively securesystems. For example, the output of netstat on a NetBSD 3.0 workstation clearly outlines this technique:
{{sxhl|2=console|
$ netstat -a
root sshd 593 4 tcp *.ssh *.*
}}
shows that on this machine only the [[Secure shell|SSH]] service is listening to all public network interfaces of the computer. [[sendmail]] is listening to the [[loopback]] [[Network interface controller|interface]] only. Access to a service may be further restricted by using a [[Unix security#Firewalls|firewall]].
==File systems==
{{main|File system permissions}}
File system security within [[UNIX]] and [[Unix-like]] systems is based on 9 permission bits, set user and group ID bits, and the [[sticky bit]], for a total of 12 bits. These permissions apply almost equally to all filesystem objects such as files, directories and devices.
The 9 permission bits are divided into three groups of three bits each. The first group describes the permissions of the file owner, the second group describes the permissions of the [[Group identifier|GID]] assigned to the file, which by default is the group associated with the file owner or the directory containing the file when it is ''[[setgid|set-GID]]'', and the third group describes the permissions associated with any process which does not have the same user ID as the file. Each group of three bits contains a bit indicating the read, write or execute access is granted. In the case of directories, execute access is interpreted as the permission to perform a filename lookup within the directory.
The set user ID and set group ID bits, commonly abbreviated ''set-UID'' and ''set-GID'' respectively, are used to change the identity of the process which executes a file having either or both of those bits set. A file having the ''[[setuid|set-UID]]'' permission bit set will cause a process which executes that file to temporarily switch the effective user ID to that of the file owner. A file having the ''[[setgid|set-GID]]'' permission bit set will cause a process which executes that file to temporarily switch the effective group ID to that of the file group. A process may then alternate between the effective user or group ID which it inherited from the file and the real user or group ID which it inherited when the user logged on to the system. This provides a mechanism by which a process may limit the access rights it possesses to those code regions which require those access rights. This is a form of a security technique known as [[privilege separation]] and improves program security by limiting the unintended or undesirable actions of a processes.
A directory having the ''set-GID'' permission bit set will cause a newly created file to have an initial file group value equal to the file group of the directory. This provides a mechanism whereby a subsystem, such as the system's mail subsystem, can create files which have a common file group value so that ''set-GID'' processes within that subsystem are then able to read or write the file.
The ''sticky bit'', formally known as the ''save text on swap'' bit, derives its name from its original purpose. Originally the ''sticky bit'' caused a process's initial memory image to be stored as a contiguous image on the disk drive which was used to store real memory pages when they were not in use. This improved the performance of commonly executed commands by making the initial memory image readily available. Modern UNIX systems no longer perform that function when the bit is set, but the name has been preserved nonetheless. In the case of files, the ''sticky-bit'' may be used by the system to indicate the style of [[file locking]] to be performed. In the case of directories, the ''sticky bit'' prevents any process, other than one which has super-user privileges or one having an effective user ID of the file owner, from deleting a file within that directory. The ''sticky bit'' is most commonly used on publicly writable directories, such as the various temporary working space directories on the system.
===Root squash===
Root squash<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/4880 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190808073023/http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/4880 |archive-date=8 August 2019 |title=Starting Share Files with NFS |last=Tykhomyrov |first=Olexiy |date=1 January 2002 |website=Linux Journal |access-date=912 AugustJune 2019 |url-status=live2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=httphttps://wwwaccess.centosredhat.orgcom/docsdocumentation/5/html/Deployment_Guide-en-USus/s1-nfs-server-config-exports.html |archive-url=https:red_hat_enterprise_linux//web.archive.org/web/20070529095927/http://www.centos.org/docs/59/html/Deployment_Guide-en-USmanaging_file_systems/s1exporting-nfs-servershares_managing-configfile-systems#the-etc-exports.html |archive-date=2007configuration-05file_exporting-nfs-29shares |title=4.6.1. The /etc/exports documentationconfiguration |publisher=CentOSfile Project- |url-status=deadChapter 4. Exporting NFS shares Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | Red Hat Customer Portal}}</ref> is a special mapping of the remote [[superuser]] (root) identity when using [[identity authentication]] (local user is the same as remote user). Under root squash, a client's uid 0 (root) is mapped to 65534 (nobody). It is primarily a feature of [[Network File System (protocol)|NFS]] but may be available on other systems as well.
Root squash is a technique to avoid privilege escalation on the client machine via suid executables [[Setuidsetuid]]. Without root squash, an attacker can generate suid binaries on the server that are executed as root on other client, even if the client user does not have superuser privileges. Hence it protects client machines against other malicious clients. It does not protect clients against a malicious server (where root can generate suid binaries), nor does it protect the files of any user other than root (as malicious clients can impersonate any user).
==SELinux==
[[SELinux]] is thean set[[Linux ofSecurity kernelModules|LSM]] extensions tofor controlcontrolling access more precisely, strictly defining both if and how files, folders, network ports and other resources can be accessed by the confined process. This systemIt is mostly used to restrict processes (database, server) rather than human users. It can also limit processes that run as root. Other distributions use comparable alternatives like [[AppArmor]].
==Viruses and virus scanners==
Unix-like operating systems are immune to most Microsoft Windows viruses because binaries created to run on Windows generally won't run on other platforms. However, many Unix like installations provide file storage services to Microsoft Windows clients, such as through the use of [[Samba software]], and may unintentionally become a repository for viruses stored by users. It is common for Unix servers to act as [[mail transfer agent]]s and as a consequence email virus scanning is often installed. The [[ClamAV]] virus scanner is available in source code form and may be used to scan Unix file systems for viruses which infect other operating systems.
There are viruses and worms that target Unix-like operating systems. In fact, the first computer worm—the [[Morris worm]]—targeted Unix systems.
==Firewalls==<!-- This section is linked from [[Unix security]] -->
===iptables===
[[iptables]] is the current user interface for interacting with [[Linux]] kernel [[netfilter]] functionality. It replaced [[ipchains]]. Other [[Unix]] like operating systems may provide their own native functionality and other [[open source]] firewall products exist. More detailed information about iptables is contained elsewhere. A brief discussion is contained here in order to describe how iptables may be used to configure a Linux firewall.
[[netfilter]] provides a state-full packet filter which can be configured according to [[Network card|network interface]], [[Internet Protocol|protocol]], [[IP address|source and/or destination address]], [[IP port|source and/or destination port]] and the state of the packet. A network packet traverses several ''chains'' between the time it is received by a network interface and the time it is accepted by the host or forwarded to another host. The common chains are {{mono|INPUT}}, {{mono|OUTPUT}} and {{mono|FORWARD}}. The {{mono|INPUT}} ''chain'' is traversed for all packets as they are received by a network interface, regardless of whether they are to be accepted by the host or forwarded to another host. The {{mono|OUTPUT}} ''chain'' is traversed for all packets as they are transmitted by a network interface. The {{mono|FORWARD}} chain is traversed for those packets are being routed through the host from one network interface to another, such as is the case for a multi-homed system (a system with more than one physical network interface).
Each of the built-in chains has a default ''policy'' which defines what action is taken for a packet which reaches the end of the chain. Packet traversal ends when a ''rule'' matches the packet and has an action of {{mono|ACCEPT}}, {{mono|DROP}}, {{mono|REJECT}} or {{mono|RETURN}}.
The simplest [[iptables]] firewall consists of ''rules'' for each desired service, followed by a rule which indicates that any packets which reach this rule are dropped. A system which only permitted, for example, incoming email traffic would have a rule which accepted connections on the [[Simple Mail Transfer Protocol|SMTP]] port, and then dropped others. A rule would be required which indicated that all established connections were also permitted so that outgoing connections would receive responses from other systems.
====INPUT chain====
====OUTPUT chain====
There is less need for an {{mono|OUTPUT}} chain and the default ''policy'' of the {{mono|OUTPUT}} chain can safely be set to {{mono|ACCEPT}}. In some instances it may be desirable for a firewall to limit certain outgoing connections to a certain set of approved systems. This is known as [[egress filtering]] and may be used to prevent viruses within the firewall from escaping to other systems. For example, it may be the policy of a network to limit outgoing email connections to a single authorized email servers as a way of combating [[e-mail spam]]. This could be achieved by the following example:
Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT)
0 0 DROP tcp—any any !server anywhere tcp dpt:smtp
There is no need to include any other rules in this example as the default policy for the {{mono|OUTPUT}} chain is {{mono|ACCEPT}}. This rule assumes that the host which is acting as the firewall will not be sending email itself, such as to the email server. This is a good assumption as typically a firewall system contains the minimal amount of system code needed to act as a firewall.
A more restrictive {{mono|OUTPUT}} chain would contain permissive ({{mono|ACCEPT}}) entries for those services which may be accessed outside the firewall and then a restrictive ({{mono|DROP}}) policy for the chain itself.
{{Wikibooks|UNIX Computing Security}}
{{Wikiversity|Unix security}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070904133250if_/http://www.dsm.fordham.edu/~moniot/Classes/InternetWebF00/unix-security/unix-security.html ''The Unix Security Model for web server administration''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061004152353/http://www.dsm.fordham.edu/~moniot/Classes/InternetWebF00/unix-security/unix-security.html |date=2006-10-04 }} Robert K. Moniot 2000
* [https://web.archive.org/web/19971211054350/http://www.alw.nih.gov/Security/Docs/network-security.html ''An Architectural Overview of UNIX Network Security''] Robert B. Reinhardt 1993
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20010815023702/http://andercheran.aiind.upv.es/toni/unix/index_en.html Unix security papers]
[[Category:Operating system security]]
[[Category:System administration]]
[[Category:Unix]]
[[Category:Linux administration]]
[[Category:Linux security software]]
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