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'''Power transition theory''' is a theory about the nature of [[war]], in relation to the [[power in international relations]].<ref name="Organski">{{Cite book|last=Organski|first=AFK|authorlink=A.F.K. Organski|title=World Politics|year=1958|___location=[[New York City|New York]]}}</ref><ref name="Wittkopf">{{Cite book|last=Wittkopf|first=Eugene R.|title=World Politics: Trend and Transformation|year=1997|publisher=St. Martin's Press|___location=[[New York City|New York]]}}</ref><ref name="Tammen">{{Cite book|last=Tammen|first=Ronald L.|title=Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century|year=2000|publisher=Seven Bridges Press}}</ref> The theory was first published in 1958 by its creator, [[A.F.K. Organski]], in his textbook, ''World Politics'' (1958).
According to Organski:
<blockquote>An even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities between contending groups of states is likely to increase the probability of war; peace is preserved best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged nations; the aggressor will come from a small group of dissatisfied strong countries; and it is the weaker, rather than the stronger power that is most likely to be the aggressor.<ref>Organski 1980, 19</ref></blockquote>
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Power transitions play an important role in applications of the [[bargaining model of war]] where wars are more likely to break out and be severe in situations of uncertainty and commitment problems. During power transitions, it is harder for actors to credibly commit to abide by any agreement, thus creating major commitment problems.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Powell|first=Robert|date=2006|title=War as a Commitment Problem|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818306060061|journal=International Organization|volume=60|issue=1|pages=|doi=10.1017/s0020818306060061|s2cid=15861342|issn=0020-8183|via=}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite book|last=Weisiger|first=Alex|date=2013|title=Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1xx5pk|language=en|publisher=Cornell University Press|volume=|pages=|jstor=10.7591/j.ctt1xx5pk|isbn=9780801451867|via=}}</ref>
According to [[Michael Beckley (political scientist)|Michael Beckley]], [[great power]] conflict can happen even when a power transition does not appear to be likely. He argues that rising powers have historically "lashed out when they realized that they would not catch their rivals or achieve their grand ambitions—unless they took drastic action. These peaking power dynamics help explain some of the most consequential geopolitical events of the past 150 years, including the surge of U.S. imperialism in the late nineteenth century, the outbreak of World War II, and Russia's 2014 [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|annexation of Crimea]] and intervention in eastern Ukraine."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Beckley |first=Michael |date=2023 |title=The Peril of Peaking Powers: Economic Slowdowns and Implications for China's Next Decade |url=https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00463 |journal=International Security}}</ref>
==See also==
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