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== History ==
[[Leslie Lamport]] invented hash-based signatures in 1979. The XMSS (eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme)<ref name="BuchmannDahmen2011">{{cite book|last1=Buchmann|first1=Johannes|last2=Dahmen|first2=Erik|last3=Hülsing|first3=Andreas|title=Post-Quantum Cryptography |chapter=XMSS - A Practical Forward Secure Signature Scheme Based on Minimal Security Assumptions |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |volume=7071|pages=117–129
== One-time signature schemes ==
Hash-based signature schemes use one-time signature schemes as their building block. A given one-time signing key can only be used to sign a single message securely. Indeed, signatures reveal part of the signing key. The security of (hash-based) one-time signature schemes relies exclusively on the security of an underlying hash function.
Commonly used one-time signature schemes include the [[Lamport signatures|Lamport–Diffie scheme]], the Winternitz scheme<ref>{{cite book|last1=Dods|first1=C.|last2=Smart|first2=N. P.|last3=Stam|first3=M.|title=Cryptography and Coding |chapter=Hash Based Digital Signature Schemes |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science
In the case of stateless hash-based signatures, few-time signature schemes are used. Such schemes allow security to decrease gradually in case a few-time key is used more than once. HORST is an example of a few-time signature scheme.
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== Examples of hash-based signature schemes ==
Since Merkle's initial scheme, numerous hash-based signature schemes with performance improvements have been introduced. Recent ones include the XMSS, the Leighton–Micali (LMS), the SPHINCS and the BPQS schemes. Most hash-based signature schemes are [[State (computer science)|stateful]], meaning that signing requires updating the secret key, unlike conventional digital signature schemes. For stateful hash-based signature schemes, signing requires keeping state of the used one-time keys and making sure they are never reused. The XMSS, LMS and BPQS<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chalkias|first1=Konstantinos|last2=Brown|first2=James|last3=Hearn|first3=Mike|last4=Lillehagen|first4=Tommy|last5=Nitto|first5=Igor|last6=Schroeter|first6=Thomas|title=Blockchained Post-Quantum Signatures|journal=Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Cybermatics-2018) |pages=1196–1203|year=2018|url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/658.pdf}}</ref> schemes are stateful, while the SPHINCS scheme is stateless. SPHINCS signatures are larger than XMSS and LMS signatures. BPQS has been designed specifically for blockchain systems. Additionally to the WOTS+ one-time signature scheme,<ref name="wotsplus"/> SPHINCS also uses a few-time (hash-based) signature scheme called HORST. HORST is an improvement of an older few-time signature scheme, HORS (Hash to Obtain Random Subset).<ref>{{cite book|last1=Reyzin|first1=Leonid|last2=Reyzin|first2=Natan|title=Information Security and Privacy |chapter=Better than BiBa: Short One-Time Signatures with Fast Signing and Verifying |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |date=2002|volume=2384
The stateful hash-based schemes XMSS and XMSS<sup>''MT''</sup> are specified in [[Request for Comments|RFC]] 8391 (XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme)
.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Hülsing|first1=Andreas|last2=Butin|first2=Denis|last3=Gazdag|first3=Stefan|last4=Rijneveld|first4=Joost|last5=Mohaisen|first5=Aziz|title=RFC 8391 – XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme|url=https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8391|website=tools.ietf.org|date=May 2018 |publisher=IETF|language=en}}</ref>
Leighton–Micali Hash-Based Signatures are specified in [[Request for Comments|RFC]] 8554.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=McGrew|first1=David|last2=Curcio|first2=Michael|last3=Fluhrer|first3=Scott|title=RFC 8554 – Leighton–Micali Hash-Based Signatures|url=https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8554|website=tools.ietf.org|date=April 2019 |publisher=IETF|language=en}}</ref> Practical improvements have been proposed in the literature that alleviate the concerns introduced by stateful schemes.<ref>{{cite book|last1=McGrew|first1=David|last2=Kampanakis|first2=Panos|last3=Fluhrer|first3=Scott|last4=Gazdag|first4=Stefan-Lukas|last5=Butin|first5=Denis|last6=Buchmann|first6=Johannes|title=Security Standardisation Research |chapter=State Management for Hash-Based Signatures |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |date=2016|volume=10074
== Implementations ==
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