Content deleted Content added
m fix |
Citation bot (talk | contribs) Add: publisher. | Use this bot. Report bugs. | Suggested by Abductive | Category:Conceptions of self | #UCB_Category 1/84 |
||
Line 52:
{{main|Social influence}}
Self-categorization theory provides an account of social influence.<ref name="Haslam, A. S. (2001)."/><ref name="Haslam, et al. (2011)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)">Turner, J. C. (1991). Social influence. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.</ref> This account is sometimes referred to as the theory of ''referent informational influence''.<ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/> According to self-categorization theory, as social identities become salient, and depersonalization and self-stereotyping occurs, people adopt the norms, beliefs, and behaviors of fellow ingroup members. They also distance themselves from the norms, beliefs, and behaviors of comparison outgroup members. When someone observes a difference between themselves and a fellow ingroup member that person will experience subjective uncertainty. That uncertainty can be resolved by either a) recategorizing people or the situation to reflect those perceived differences, or b) engaging in a social influence process whereby one person makes changes to become more similar to the other. Which person adopts the views or behaviors of the other (i.e. who influences who) is predicted to be that person who is most prototypical of the ingroup. In other words, the person who exemplifies the norms, values, and behaviors of the ingroup the most. The self-categorization theory account of social influence has received a large amount of empirical support.<ref name="McGarty & Turner (1992).">{{cite journal|last1 = McGarty|first1 = C.|last2=Turner|first2=J. C. |title = The effects of categorization on social judgement|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 31|issue = 4| pages = 253–268|year = 1992|doi=10.1111/j.2044-8309.1992.tb00971.x}}</ref><ref name="Makie & Wright (2001)">{{cite book | last1 = Mackie | first1 =D. M. | last2 = Wright | first2 = C. L. | editor1-last = Brown | editor1-first = Rupert | editor2-last = Gaertner |editor2-first = Sam L. | year = 2001 | chapter = Social Influence in an Intergroup context |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC&pg=PA281| title = Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup Processes |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC| volume = 3 | issue = 1 | publisher =John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-470-69270-7 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Livingstone|first1=A. G.|last2=Haslam|first2=S. A.|last3=Postmes|first3=T.|last4=Jetten|first4=J.|title="We Are, Therefore We Should": Evidence That In-Group Identification Mediates the Acquisition of In-Group Norms|journal=Journal of Applied Social Psychology|year=2011|volume=41|issue=8|pages=1857–1876|doi=10.1111/j.1559-1816.2011.00794.x}}</ref>
Self-categorization theory's account of social influence differs from other social psychological approaches to social influence. It rejects the traditional distinction between [[informational influence]] and [[normative influence]],<ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)"/><ref name="Turner & Oakes, (1997)">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = J. C. | last2 = Oakes | first2 = P. J. | editor1-last = McGarty | editor1-first = C. | editor2-last = Haslam | editor2-first = S. A. | year = 1997 | title = The socially structured mind | journal = The Message of Social Psychology | pages = 355–373 }}</ref> where informational influence involves the assessment of social information based on its merit and normative influence involves public compliance to the expectations of group members. For self-categorization theory social information does not have merit independent of self-categorization. Instead, information is perceived as valid to the extent that it is perceived to be a normative belief of the ingroup. Normative influence, on the other hand, is not normative at all. Rather, it is counter-normative influence based compliance to expectations of psychological outgroup members. In a similar vein self-categorization theory also challenges the distinction between objective reality testing and social reality testing (e.g. the [[elaboration likelihood model]]).<ref name="Oakes et al. (1994)."/><ref name="Turner & Oakes (1986)."/><ref name="Turner, J. C. et al. (1987)."/><ref name="Turner (1985)"/><ref name="Turner (1982)"/><ref name="Turner, J. C. (1991)"/><ref name="Turner & Oakes, (1997)"/><ref name="Oakes & Reynolds (1997)">{{cite journal|last1=Oakes|first1=P. J.|last2=Reynolds|first2=R. J.|title=Asking the accuracy question: is measurement the answer?|journal=The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life|year=1997|pages=119–143|editor1-first=R.|editor1-last=Spears|editor2-first=P.J.|editor2-last=Oakes|editor3-first=N.|editor3-last=Ellemers|editor4-first=S.A.|display-editors = 3 |editor4-last=Haslam}}</ref> It argues that there is no such thing as objective reality testing isolated from social reality testing. Sensory data is always interpreted with respect of the beliefs and ideas of the perceiver, which in turn are bound up in the psychological group memberships of that perceiver.
Line 74:
===Motivation in the theory===
Brewer and Brown describe self-categorization theory as a "version of social identity theory" that is heavily cognitive and is not attentive to many motivational and affective processes.<ref name="Brewer & Brown (1998)">{{cite journal | last1 = Brewer | first1 = M. B. | last2 = Brown | first2 = R. J. | editor-last = Gilbert | editor-first = D. T. | editor2-last = Fiske | editor2-first = S. T. | editor3-last = Lindzey | editor3-first = G. | year = 1998 | title = Intergroup relations | journal = The Handbook of Social Psychology | volume = 2 | pages = 554–594 }}</ref> Turner and Reynolds, in response to this style of commentary, counter that describing self-categorization theory as a replacement to social identity theory is an error, and that self-categorization theory was always intended to complement social identity theory.<ref name="Turner & Reynolds (2001)">{{cite book | last1 = Turner | first1 = John C. | last2 = Reynolds | first2 =Katherine J. | editor1-last = Brown | editor1-first = Rupert | editor2-last = Gaertner | editor2-first = Sam L. | year = 2001 | chapter = The Social Identity Perspective in Intergroup Relations: Theories, Themes, and Controversies |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC&pg=PA133 | title = Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LNZHf3K4xzMC | volume = 3 | issue = 1 | publisher = John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-470-69270-7 }}</ref> Turner and Reynolds also argue that such commentary unreasonably discounts the motivational concerns that are articulated in self-categorization theory.<ref name="Turner & Reynolds (2001)"/> For example, the motivation to maintain positive self categories and the motivation to achieve ingroup consensus.<ref name="Turner (1985)"/>
==References==
|