Open-fields doctrine: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 09:36, 6 January 2024

Revision as of 09:48, 6 January 2024

Line 22:

==Rejections of doctrine by state courts==

Since ''Oliver'', the highest courts of [[Montana]], [[New York (state)|New York]], [[Oregon]] and [[Vermont]], as well as a [[Washington (state)|Washington]] state appeals court, have held that the open-fields doctrine does not apply in those states due to their state constitutions granting greater protections to citizens (under [[dual sovereignty]] a state may grant its citizens more rights than those guaranteed in the federal constitution). Since ''Katz'' grounded privacy in persons rather than places, they argue, landowners who have taken affirmative steps to exclude the public, such as fencing or posting the [[boundary (real estate)|boundsboundaries]], assertare thereby asserting a privacy interest sufficient to prevail over any warrantless search of the property where common exceptions such as [[hot pursuit]] and plain view do not apply. Some of those opinions have been critical of not only ''Oliver'' but ''Hester''.

In a 2017 [[concurring opinion]] where the doctrine did not come into play in overturning a [[Wisconsin]] farmer's convictions for threatening two state game wardens he believed had been illegal hunters trespassing on his land, Justice [[Rebecca Bradley]] of [[Wisconsin Supreme Court|that state's Supreme Court]] was highly critical of it.<ref name="State v. Stietz">{{cite court |litigants=State v. Stietz|vol=895|reporter=[[North Western Reporter|N.W. 2d]]|opinion=796|court=[[Wisconsin Supreme Court|Wisc.]]|date=2017|pinpoint=812–815|url=https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15612653012475974548|access-date=September 17, 2019}}</ref>