Computing Machinery and Intelligence: Difference between revisions

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##''A machine cannot be the subject of its own thought'' (or can't be [[self-aware]]). A program which can report on its internal states and processes, in the simple sense of a [[debugger]] program, can certainly be written. Turing asserts "a machine can undoubtably be its own subject matter."

##''A machine cannot have much diversity of behaviour''. He notes that, with enough storage capacity, a computer can behave in an astronomical number of different ways.

#''[[Ada Lovelace|Lady Lovelace]]'s Objection'': One of the most famous objections states that computers are incapable of originality. This is largely because, according to [[Ada Lovelace]], machines are incapable of independent learning.<blockquote>The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to ''originate'' anything. It can do whatever ''we know how to order it'' to perform. It can follow analysis; but it has no power of anticipating any analytical relations or truths.<ref>[[wikisource:Scientific_Memoirs/3/Sketch_of_the_Analytical_Engine_invented_by_Charles_Babbage,_Esq./Notes_by_the_Translator|Scientific Memoirs edited by Richard Taylor (1781-18581781–1858), Volume 3, Sketch of the Analytical Engine invented by Charles Babbage, Esq, Notes by the Translator, by Augusta Ada Lovelace. 1843]]</ref></blockquote> Turing suggests that Lovelace's objection can be reduced to the assertion that computers "can never take us by surprise" and argues that, to the contrary, computers could still surprise humans, in particular where the consequences of different facts are not immediately recognizable. Turing also argues that Lady Lovelace was hampered by the context from which she wrote, and if exposed to more contemporary scientific knowledge, it would become evident that the brain's storage is quite similar to that of a computer.

#''Argument from continuity in the nervous system'': Modern [[neurological]] research has shown that the brain is not digital. Even though [[neuron]]s fire in an all-or-nothing pulse, both the exact timing of the pulse and the probability of the pulse occurring have analog components. Turing acknowledges this, but argues that any analog system can be simulated to a reasonable degree of accuracy given enough computing power. ([[Philosopher]] [[Hubert Dreyfus]] would make this argument against "the biological assumption" in 1972.)<ref>{{Harvnb|Dreyfus|1979|p=156}}</ref>

#''Argument from the informality of behaviour'': This argument states that any system governed by laws will be predictable and therefore not truly intelligent. Turing replies by stating that this is confusing laws of behaviour with general rules of conduct, and that if on a broad enough scale (such as is evident in man) machine behaviour would become increasingly difficult to predict. He argues that, just because we can't immediately see what the laws are, does not mean that no such laws exist. He writes "we certainly know of no circumstances under which we could say, 'we have searched enough. There are no such laws.'". ([[Hubert Dreyfus]] would argue in 1972 that human reason and problem solving was not based on formal rules, but instead relied on instincts and awareness that would never be captured in rules. More recent AI research in [[robotics]] and [[computational intelligence]] attempts to find the complex rules that govern our "informal" and unconscious skills of perception, mobility and pattern matching. See [[Dreyfus' critique of AI]]).<ref>{{Harvnb|Dreyfus|1972}}, {{Harvnb|Dreyfus|Dreyfus|1986}}, {{Harvnb|Moravec|1988}} and {{Harvnb|Russell|Norvig|2003|pp=51–52}}, who identify Dreyfus' argument with the one Turing answers.</ref> This rejoinder also includes the [[Turing's Wager]] argument.