Pramana: Difference between revisions

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'''''Pramana''''' ({{Lang-sa|प्रमाण}}, {{IAST|Pramāṇa}}) literally means "[[Proof (truth)|proof]]" and "means of knowledge".<ref name=sepramana>[http://spokensanskrit.org/index.php?tran_input=pramANa&direct=se&script=hk&link=yes&mode=3 pramANa] Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Koeln University, Germany</ref><ref name=jalo>James Lochtefeld, "Pramana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 2: N-Z, Rosen Publishing. {{ISBN|0-8239-2287-1}}, pages 520-521</ref> In Indian philosophies, pramana are the means which can lead to knowledge, and serve as one of the core concepts in Indian [[epistemology]]. It has been one of the key, much debated fields of study in [[Hinduism]], [[Buddhism]] and [[Jainism]] since ancient times. It is a theory of knowledge, and encompasses one or more reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge.<ref name=jalo/> The focus of pramana is how correct knowledge can be acquired, how one knows, how one does not know, and to what extent knowledge pertinent about someone or something can be acquired.<ref name=kp/><ref name=dpsb>DPS Bhawuk (2011), Spirituality and Indian Psychology (Editor: Anthony Marsella), Springer, {{ISBN|978-1-4419-8109-7}}, page 172</ref>

While the number of pramanas varies widely from system to system, many ancient and medieval Indian texts identify six{{efn|A few Indian scholars such as Vedvyasa discuss ten, Krtakoti discusses eight, but six is most widely accepted. Some systems admit as few as three pramanas. See Andrew J. Nicholson (2013), ''[[Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History]]'', Columbia University Press, {{ISBN|978-0231149877}}, pages 149-150; see also [https://www.britannica.com/topic/pramana the Encyclopedia Britannica entry] on this topic.}} ''pramanas'' as correct means of accurate knowledge and to truths: Three central pramanas which are almost universally accepted, which are [[perception]] (Sanskrit ''pratyakṣa),'' [[inference]] (''anumāna''), and "word", meaning the [[testimony]] of past or present reliable experts (''[[Śabda]]''); and more contentious ones, which are comparison and analogy (''[[upamāna]]''), postulation, derivation from circumstances (''arthāpatti''), and non-perception, negative/cognitive proof (''[[anupalabdhi]]'').<ref name=dpsb/><ref name=gflood>[[Gavin Flood]], An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, {{ISBN|978-0521438780}}, page 225</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Pramana |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/pramana |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=16 June 2020}}</ref> Each of these are further categorized in terms of conditionality, completeness, confidence and possibility of error, by each school of Indian philosophies.

The various schools of Indian philosophies vary on how many of these six are epistemically reliable and valid means to knowledge.<ref>P Bilimoria (1993), Pramāṇa epistemology: Some recent developments, in Asian philosophy - Volume 7 (Editor: G Floistad), Springer, {{ISBN|978-94-010-5107-1}}, pages 137-154</ref> For example, the [[Carvaka]] school of the [[Śramaṇa]] tradition holds that only one (perception) is a reliable source of knowledge,<ref name=kamal/> Buddhism holds two (perception, inference) are valid means,<ref name=ds/><ref name=jag/> Jainism holds three (perception, inference and testimony),<ref name=jag>John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, {{ISBN|978-0791430675}}, page 238</ref> while [[Mimamsa]] and [[Advaita Vedanta]] schools of Hinduism hold that all six are useful and can be reliable means to knowledge.<ref name=eliottjag>