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Although largely theoretical, implementation theory may have profound implications on policy creation because some [[Social choice theory|social choice]] rules may be impossible to implement under specific game conditions.<ref name="palfrey" />
== Implementability ==
In '''[[mechanism design]]''', implementability is a property of a [[social choice function]]. It means that there is an [[incentive-compatible]] mechanism that attains ("implements") this function. There are several degrees of implementability, corresponding to the different degrees of incentive-compatibility, including:
* A function is '''dominant-strategy implementable''' if it is attainable by a mechanism which is dominant-strategy-incentive-compatible (also called [[strategyproof]]).
* A function is '''Bayesian-Nash implementable''' if it is attainable by a mechanism which is Bayesian-Nash-incentive-compatible.
See for a recent reference. In some textbooks, the entire field of mechanism design is called '''[[implementation theory]]'''.<ref>Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein: A Course in Game Theory (1994).</ref>
== See also ==
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