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==== Domain expertise ====
Expertise in a particular field has been shown to increase algorithm aversion<ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Mahmud|first1=H.|last2=Islam|first2=A.N.|last3=Luo|first3=X.R.|last4=Mikalef|first4=P.|date=2024|title=Decoding algorithm appreciation: Unveiling the impact of familiarity with algorithms, tasks, and algorithm performance|journal=Decision Support Systems|volume=179|page=114168|doi=10.1016/j.dss.2024.114168|issn=0167-9236|url=https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2024.114168}}</ref> and reduce use of algorithmic decision rules.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=1986-02-01|title=Factors influencing the use of a decision rule in a probabilistic task|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0749597886900464|journal=Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes|language=en|volume=37|issue=1|pages=93–110|doi=10.1016/0749-5978(86)90046-4|issn=0749-5978|last1=Arkes|first1=Hal R.|last2=Dawes|first2=Robyn M.|last3=Christensen|first3=Caryn}}</ref> Overconfidence may partially explain this effect; experts might feel that an algorithm is not capable of the types of judgments they make. Compared to non-experts, experts also have more knowledge of the field and therefore may be more critical of a recommendation. Where a non-expert might accept a recommendation ("The algorithm must know something I don't.") the expert might find specific fault with the algorithm's recommendation ("This recommendation does not account for a particular factor").
[[Decision-making]] research has shown that experts in a given field tend to think about decisions differently than a non-expert.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Feltovich|first1=Paul J.|title=Studies of Expertise from Psychological Perspectives|date=2006|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-expertise-and-expert-performance/studies-of-expertise-from-psychological-perspectives/3A7FF4C6F3426BE751C71EDF84927741|work=The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance|pages=41–68|editor-last=Ericsson|editor-first=K. Anders|series=Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology|place=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/cbo9780511816796.004|isbn=978-1-107-81097-6|access-date=2021-09-08|last2=Prietula|first2=Michael J.|last3=Ericsson|first3=K. Anders|editor2-last=Charness|editor2-first=Neil|editor3-last=Feltovich|editor3-first=Paul J.|editor4-last=Hoffman|editor4-first=Robert R.}}</ref> Experts chunk and group information; for example, [[chess]] [[Grandmaster (chess)|grandmasters]] will see opening positions (e.g., the [[Queen's Gambit]] or the [[Bishop's Opening]]) instead of individual pieces on the board. Experts may see a situation as a functional representation (e.g., a doctor could see a trajectory and predicted outcome for a patient instead of a list of medications and symptoms). These differences may also partly account for the increased algorithm aversion seen in experts.
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