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}}.</ref> Since analytic equivalency, for two objects X and Y, logically results in the question "Is it true that X is Y?" being meaningless (by Moore's own argument), to say that the question is meaningless is to concede analytic equivalency. Thus Moore begs the question in the second premise. He assumes that the question is a meaningful one (i.e. that it is an open question). This begs the question and the open-question argument thus fails.
In response to this, the open-question argument can be reformulated.<ref>{{Harvnb|Copp|2001}}.</ref> The Darwall-Gibbard-Railton reformulation argues for the impossibility of equating a moral property with a non-moral one using the internalist theory of motivation. Goodness, on this account, is the property which ideally gives rise to certain internal states (motivations, sentiments, desires to act), but is not, itself, equivalent to those states.
The internalist, or Humean, theory of motivation ([[belief–desire–intention model]]) is the view that if one has a reason to act, one must have some desire which would be fulfilled by that act, compared to the externalist theory of motivation, which holds that we may have reasons to act absent any accompanying desire. According to internalism, moral motivation comes from the (global) benefit or utility of moral sentiments or actions. On the other hand, externalism holds that moral properties give us reasons for acting independent of desire or utility. If internalism is true, then the OQA may avoid begging the question against the naturalist by claiming that the moral properties and the motivations to act belong to different categories, and therefore, necessarily are not analytically equivalent. That is, it remains an open question whether the properties which do give rise to certain sentiments ''ought'' to guide our actions in that way. To argue for the special motivational effects of moral beliefs is to commit the fallacy of [[special pleading]].
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{{Main|Sense and reference}}
Sense and reference are two different aspects of some terms' [[Meaning (linguistic)|meanings]]. A term's ''reference'' is the ''object'' to which the term refers, while the term's ''sense'' is the ''way'' that the term refers to that object.
There is a difference between the sense of a term and its reference (i.e. the object itself).<ref>{{Harvnb|Copp|2001}}.</ref> Thus, we can understand a claim like "goodness is identical with pleasure" as an ''[[Empirical evidence|a posteriori]]'' identity claim similar to "Water is H<sub>2</sub>O". The question "This is H<sub>2</sub>O but is it water?" is intelligible and so, in that limited sense, whether or not water is H<sub>2</sub>O is an open question; note that this does not address the issue of significance. But that does not lead us to conclude that water is not H<sub>2</sub>O. "Water is H<sub>2</sub>O" is an identity claim that is known to be true ''a posteriori'' (i.e., it was discovered via empirical investigation). Another example is "redness" being identical to certain phenomena of electromagnetism. This is discovered by empirical investigation. Similarly, many moral naturalists argue that "rightness" can be discovered as an ''a posteriori'' truth, by investigating the different claims, like that of pleasure being the good, or of duty being the good.
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=== The Linguistic Solution ===
The linguistic solution proposed by Max Black states that a in fact can equal b and be informative because the information you gain from a definition is which expressions pick out the same concept.<ref>
|last1= Black |first1= Max
|year= 1944
|title= The "Paradox of Analysis"
|publisher= Oxford University Press
}}.</ref> For example, saying that someone is a bachelor is equivalent to saying that the person can be equally well described by the phrase "an unmarried man". Even though the two expressions mean the same thing, what we have learned is that the combination of letters that make up the word "bachelor" picks out the same concept as the particular combination of spaces and letters as "an unmarried man". Similarly consider the math example of 3x7=21 and 1x21=21. It is certainly true that "3x7" and "1x21" pick out the same number and as a result, would not say that no information was gained by saying 3x7=1x21. We would not say this because we have learned that the expression "3x7" picks out the same number as the expression "1x21".<ref>
|last1= Black |first1= Max
|year= 1944
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=== The "Explicit Knowledge" Solution ===
The "explicit knowledge" solution comes from philosophers Mark Balaguer and Terry Horgan. The goal of the "explicit knowledge" solution is to say that a good analysis will take someone from being able to implicitly apply the concept correctly, to being able to explicitly explain and know why their application is correct.<ref>
|last1= Balaguer, Horgan |first1= Mark, Terry
|year= 2016
|title= Analysis
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|pages= 3–7
|publisher= Oxford University Press
}}.</ref> The information we gain then, is how to make explicit what we before only knew implicitly. Take a circle for example. Most children and adults if you ask them to pick which things are circles would be able to. However, if you ask them what the definition of a circle is, most people will struggle. The definition of a circle is "a plane figure bounded by one curved line, and such that all straight lines drawn from a certain point within it to the bounding line, are equal. The bounding line is called its circumference and the point, its centre."<ref>
|last1= Euclid |year= 1883
|title= Books. I, II
|publisher= Oxford University Press
}}.</ref> To someone who knows implicitly what a circle is, upon hearing this definition will say, "of course" or "that makes sense" because they had the implicit knowledge. All the definition, or analysis, did, was to make explicit what the children and adults already implicitly knew about the concept of "circle". Therefore, the solution says that an analysis is informative because it creates explicit knowledge to those who only had implicit knowledge of the concept prior to knowing the definition.<ref>
|last1= Balaguer, Horgan |first1= Mark, Terry
|year= 2016
|title= Analysis
| |||