Revision as of 11:26, 19 August 2022 edit Torpeniczel (talk \| contribs) 1 edit Added "where the bearer exists", because the statement about "all possible worlds" is meaningless without it. It is now in accordance with Kripke's definition. ← Previous edit		Revision as of 23:13, 6 November 2024 edit undo Joanie444caucus (talk \| contribs) 10 edits m i deleted a comma between subject ("weaker versions") and verb ("claim"): "not properly called "causal theories") claim" Next edit →
Line 4: * later uses of the name succeed in referring to the referent by being linked to that original act via a [[Causality\|causal chain]]. Weaker versions of the position (perhaps not properly called "causal theories"), claim merely that, in many cases, events in the causal history of a speaker's use of the term, including when the term was first acquired, must be considered to correctly assign references to the speaker's words. Causal theories of names became popular during the 1970s, under the influence of work by Saul Kripke and [[Keith Donnellan]]. Kripke and [[Hilary Putnam]] also defended an analogous causal account of [[natural kind]] terms.

Causal theory of reference: Difference between revisions