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#''[[Religious]] Objection'': This states that thinking is a function of man's [[Immortality|immortal]] [[soul]]; therefore, a machine cannot think. "In attempting to construct such machines," wrote Turing, "we should not be irreverently usurping His power of creating souls, any more than we are in the procreation of children: rather we are, in either case, instruments of His will providing mansions for the souls that He creates."
#'' 'Heads in the Sand' Objection'': "The consequences of machines thinking would be too dreadful. Let us hope and believe that they cannot do so." This thinking is popular among intellectual people, as they believe superiority derives from higher intelligence and [[Existential risk from artificial general intelligence|the possibility of being overtaken is a threat]] (as machines have efficient memory capacities and processing speed, machines exceeding the learning and knowledge capabilities are highly probable). This objection is a fallacious [[appeal to consequences]], confusing what should not be with what can or cannot be (Wardrip-Fruin, 56).
#''The [[Mathematics|Mathematical]] Objection'': This objection uses mathematical theorems, such as [[Gödel's incompleteness theorem]], to show that there are limits to what questions a computer system based on [[logic]] can answer. Turing suggests that humans are too often wrong themselves and pleased at the fallibility of a machine. (This argument would be made again by philosopher [[John Lucas (philosopher)|John Lucas]] in 1961 and [[physicist]] [[Roger Penrose]] in 1989, and later would be called [[Penrose–Lucas argument]].)<ref>{{Harvnb|Lucas|1961}}, {{Harvnb|Penrose|1989}}, {{Harvnb|Hofstadter|1979|pp=471–473,476–477}} and {{Harvnb|Russell|Norvig|2003|pp=949–950}}. Russell and Norvig identify Lucas and Penrose's arguments as being the same one answered by Turing.</ref>
#''Argument From [[Consciousness]]'': This argument, suggested by Professor [[Geoffrey Jefferson]] in his 1949 [[Lister Medal|Lister Oration]] (acceptance speech for his 1948 award of Lister Medal<ref>{{Cite journal |year=1948 |title=Announcements |journal=Nature |volume=162 |issue=4108 |pages=138 |bibcode=1948Natur.162U.138. |doi=10.1038/162138e0 |doi-access=free}}</ref>) states that "not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals brain."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Jefferson |first=Geoffrey |date=1949-06-25 |title=The Mind of Mechanical Man |journal=British Medical Journal |volume=1 |issue=4616 |pages=1105–1110 |doi=10.1136/bmj.1.4616.1105 |issn=0007-1447 |pmc=2050428 |pmid=18153422}}</ref> Turing replies by saying that we have no way of knowing that any individual other than ourselves experiences emotions, and that therefore we should accept the test. He adds, "I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness ... [b]ut I do not think these mysteries necessarily need to be solved before we can answer the question [of whether machines can think]." (This argument, that a computer can't have ''conscious experiences'' or ''understanding'', would be made in 1980 by philosopher [[John Searle]] in his [[Chinese room]] argument. Turing's reply is now known as the "[[problem of other minds|other minds]] reply". See also [[Philosophy of artificial intelligence#Can a machine have a mind, consciousness and mental states?|Can a machine have a mind?]] in the [[philosophy of AI]].)<ref>{{Harvnb|Searle|1980}} and {{Harvnb|Russell|Norvig|2003|pp=958–960}}, who identify Searle's argument with the one Turing answers.</ref>
#''Arguments from various disabilities''. These arguments all have the form "a computer will never do ''X''". Turing offers a selection:<blockquote>Be kind, resourceful, beautiful, friendly, have initiative, have a sense of humour, tell right from wrong, make mistakes, fall in love, enjoy strawberries and cream, make someone fall in love with it, learn from experience, use words properly, be the subject of its own thought, have as much diversity of behaviour as a man, do something really new.</blockquote>Turing notes that "no support is usually offered for these statements," and that they depend on naive assumptions about how versatile machines may be in the future, or are "disguised forms of the argument from consciousness." He chooses to answer a few of them:
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