Word and Object: Difference between revisions

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==Synopsis==

Quine emphasizes his [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]], the doctrine that philosophy should be pursued as part of natural science.<ref name="Hookway772">{{cite book |author=Hookway, C. J. |editor=Honderich, Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |___location=Oxford |year=2005 |page=779 |isbn=0-19-926479-1 }}</ref> He argues in favor of naturalizing [[epistemology]], [[physicalism]] as against [[phenomenalism]] and [[Mind–body dualism|mind-body dualism]], and [[extensionality]] as against [[intension]]ality. He also develops a behavioristic conception of sentence-meaning, theorizes about language learning, speculates on the ontogenesis of reference, explains various forms of ambiguity and vagueness, and recommends measures for regimenting language so as to eliminate ambiguity and vagueness as well as to make a theory's logic and [[ontic]] commitments perspicuous ("to be is to be the value of a bound variable"). He argues, moreover, against quantified modal logic and the [[essentialism]] it presupposes, argues for [[Platonic realism]] in mathematics, rejects [[instrumentalism]] in favor of [[scientific realism]], develops a view of philosophical analysis as explication, argues against analyticity and for [[holism]], against countenancing propositions, and tries to show that the meanings of theoretical sentences are indeterminate and that the reference of terms is inscrutable.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-dictionary-of-philosophy/50389231FC1A5DF1B1BF0F4140264792 |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |date=2015 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |editor-last=Audi |editor-first=Robert |edition=3 |___location=Cambridge |pages=897–898 |doi=10.1017/cbo9781139057509|isbn=978-1-139-05750-9 }}</ref>

==Behaviorism==